Aminatou Haidar is occupying the centre stage in the new chapter on the Western Sahara Conflict. More coverage here and here. Of note is the Algerian complete silence on the issue – which is rather typical.
Morroco’s main strategy is to advance the idea that the conflict is a made up one – and that Algeria is the real adversary. The view is partly correct: Algeria does fund and give political and territorial support for Polisario, and the western Sahara issue is the only issue they spend money on lobbying (soft term for bribing) in Washington. Aminatou Haidar’s hunger strike, as embarrassing as it is for Morroco and as perturbing as it is for Spain, is a convenient perfect argument for Algeria to counter the strategy of Al Maghzen – they need not say a word and the saga will continue to be a public relations nightmare for both countries and a point for Algeria, as it moves the focus of the conflict from the Morrocan-Algerian Axis to the Moroccan-Polisario axis, or even more conveniently, to the Moroccan-Spanish Axis. The more adversaries in the conflict the better – while they are at it, bring in human rights organisations if possible.
Algeria’s main strategy towards the conflict was to try and delegate the problem to the Polisario when possible, and to just act behind the scenes. Algeria’s success at prolonging and aggravating the problem is rather remarkable – even more remarkable is its success in helping to shape the terms of the conflict and its image in the world as she wishes – all the while appearing to care much less about the issue than Morocco. In terms of public relations, both internationally and domestically, Algeria’s strategy is two-fold depending on the audience.
Internationally, since the days when it had an active role in third world politics and the non alignment movement (When the current president Bouteflika was the secretary of foreign affairs – great video, the guy always had a sharp tongue) Algeria’s main argument overseas is to insist that it is championing the self-determination rights of the Western Saharan people. Having declared independence in 1962 after such a vote, the argument was strong, and is still rather powerful despite the rise of federalism and the tendency of independence voices in various parts around the world to be quieted down through a form of a republic federalist compromise or by completely refusing to succumb: Iraq’s Kurds, Northern Ireland, the failure of the PLO so far to create a state and Eta in Spain are examples (the Balkan region is an exception to this because of its rather different history, and Scotland is also in a separate group – I don’t think the efforts of the SNP for independence from the union will be successful after all).
A refugee camp for Sahrawis in Tindouf - The Polisario is housed in Tindouf
Despite its horrific human rights record, especially in the “black decade” of the 90s, Algeria also often uses this conflict to bolster an image of a human rights campaigner for the rights of the Western Saharan people – the Algerian authorities have for long maintained that they support democracy in the region, supposedly being a democracy (at least on paper) as opposed to the monarchy in Morocco. This image of a democracy championing state was rather conveniently supported by Bush’s New Middle East doctrine: then, the Algerian authorities declared that they are unconcerned by the initiative because, hey, we are a democracy and see, we also want democracy elsewhere. Their tactic here and Bush’s initiative conveniently blend well. Domestically, the Algerian authorities used this argument for all it’s worth.
Turning to its domestic strategy, as is the case for most foreign conflicts, the Western conflict is a convenient rallying point for the authorities (this strategy is shared with Morocco as well). This is a standard procedure with most states – keep the population busy overseas and try to use nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings towards the issue. Algeria has been very successful domestically at rallying the whole nation, be it media, newspapers, parties of the whole spectrum behind the authorities. There is almost totally no dissident voice moving even an iota towards the Morrocan stance. Any hint of such a stance is squarely quashed. A few years ago , “Rida Talyani” (literally, Rida the italian), a pop singer, wore the Moroccan flag and expressed his support for a Moroccan Western Sahara in a concert in Morocco – his music plunged from top of the charts to absolute obscurity very quickly as he was banned (unofficially) from participating in concerts and from any TV or Radio programme.
The historical 5 Algerian figures detained by France after the hijacking, 1956, allegedly with Moroccan help
The issue is a handy agreement point between the government, the newspapers and the opposition. Almost all the newspapers, persecuted or not, state run or private, in Arabic or in French rally staunchly behind the government on this issue. Likewise, opposition parties, left or Kabyle region based, as well as Islamist parties such as the MSP follow the government line. The Moroccan monarchy provides very little incentive to rationalise an ulterior opinion. Any potential remorse to Pan-Arabism, Islamic Solidarity or Maghreb El-Kebir politics can usually be squarely addressed by the claim that Monarchy has sold out and that the Moroccan compass has always been turned towards the West since Hassan II, who has a draconian evil reputation attached to him because of his alleged role in the airplane hijacking of the five Algerian revolution figures in 1956, his supposed collaboration with Israel, allegations by the famous Egyptian journalist Heikel of spying for the West during Arab summit meetings and the list goes on.
Behind the arguments, Algeria’s stance without a doubt is not about the plight of the Saharan people. Algeria’s authorities are still, indeed, very much paranoid about the Moroccan claim to Algerian territories, a claim that Morocco has not withdrawn since it was made in the fifties. The hawks in the army will do their best to weaken the Moroccan side – better have the conflict and Moroccan land claims over there than anywhere on Algerian soil. In her view, Algeria has been bitten twice before, and the Sand War of 1963 is viewed in a bad light as Morocco tried to take Algerian western territories by force directly after the independence, supposedly taking the opportunity of the weakness of the infant Algerian state.
That war, ironically, helped stabilise the country at a time when tensions were very high among army leaders and civil wars were close to being declared over who rules the country. It would seem that the Algerian élite realised the potential of the conflict as way to score political points since then, and they seem to have been successful so far. A potential route to the Atlantic Ocean is an attractive notion as well.
Unfortunately Algerian fears make the conflict very much a military one between Algeria and Morocco. There is an ongoing fierce armament battle between the two countries (or rather, spending battles), with both countries buying military aircraft and equipment to the tune of several billion dollars. Most of the Algerian Military’s arsenal is based in the west of the country facing Morocco: in Sidi Belabes, Tindouf, Oran, Mers el-Kebir, etc.
In the absence of substantial political reform in the region, and especially in both countries, the conflict will continue to be prolonged over what is described by many as a lifeless patch of sand. A final solution has to include both countries as well as the Polisario and Mauritania, and has to leave no questions asked over the sovereignty of each state.
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December 9, 2009 at 12:48
alle
Nice post!
My impression of the Algerian view of POLISARIO is that elite support is very solid, but ordinary people are not really involved … in foreign policy, it’s all Palestine. Many that I’ve spoken to passively accept the argument that WS has a just cause and that it’s a pillar of their foreign policy, but are also troubled by the poor relations with Morocco. I think the prevailing view that I’ve encountered is that backing the POLISARIO is the right thing to do, but basically something for the state to handle, which most people are not emotionally invested in. Would love to hear your take on that.
Also, I do think that ideology may have played some part at the moment when the decision was taken initially, by Boumediene. Sure Algerian border interests and the rivalry with Hassan were paramount, but I recall reading several accounts of how he was personally impressed with POLISARIO, and how that helped settle the case in favor of challenging Morocco. Now, obviously that’s the version Algeria would like to push, but there could be truth to it still; and there definitely was a strand of thinking in the Algerian elite that “revolutionary” causes should be supported as a matter of principle. Also I get the sense that Boumediene decided to go all in when he saw Algeria getting cut out of the affair by Morocco, and that he preferred to go to war over being treated as a bit player — perhaps that was even the most important trigger at the time.
December 9, 2009 at 18:43
Kal
Re: On the street views. Just to give a personal take: I recall a conversation with some students in Hydra when I was last in Algeria where I asked a boy about what he thought about Algeria’s role in the Third World. He responded that “we should do more to improve the situation in the Occupied Territories,” and another student, a girl, said “yes, it is terrible what the Israelis are doing to Gaza!” Everyone agreed with her, but the original guy said “No, no, I mean in the Sahara!” Awkward silence followed after, but nobody disagreed. One the other students finally said “sh*t on Morocco and the Zionists!”
December 10, 2009 at 01:28
Houwari
Thanks for your thoughtful comment alle – you’re right, the Palestinian plight is without a doubt the number one issue , Boumediene’s “Dalima or Madlouma” quote rings true to any Algerian. I recall seeing heavily intoxicated people in a corner once swearing to go and fight for them. The Sahara issue, while not as highly regarded, is still quite supported, most because of nationalistic tendencies – recall that many were called to the army on the western front in the 70s and 80s. Many have also largely bought into the self determination argument – Kal’s anecdote is an example.
I did not cover your very good second point well. Indeed, Boumediene’s presented the issue as an ideological one, and for many years the conflict provided fuel for their active diplomacy and stance as a non-aligned revolutionary country. On the other hand, they seem selective on who to support – Kosovo is rather a glaring example that left me seriously wondering.
December 10, 2009 at 02:35
alle
I do agree that the Algerian government is selective/hypocritical in many cases, but I don’t think Kosovo is quite the same sort of question. There was no real legal case for Kosovo’s independence at the outset, although probably a moral one, and possibly a practical one, put them in whatever order you like. It was recognized Serbian territory, and still remains that in the eyes of a majority of the world’s governments. (Kosovo in fact appears to have collected about as many state recognitions for its independence as RASD…)
One should recognize that Algeria seems to have been reasonably consistent in supporting inherited/existing/UN-approved borders as a basis for sovereignty just about everywhere, even if I think that may be more coincidence than principle. The preservation of recognized borders against irredentism is the case for self-determination in WS (it was not part of colonial-era Morocco, or immediately before it) and it’s, most notably, the case for Algeria’s own borders against Moroccan claims. It also happens to be the case against Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.
A clear exception, on the other hand, would be Algeria’s brief flirtation with the Canary Islands separatist movement — that is and was uncontested Spanish territory, and it only came about as an instrument to punish Spain for abetting Morocco in Western Sahara (nevermind that the inhabitants didn’t want independence either).
December 10, 2009 at 09:10
Houwari
The Canary Islands flirtation is very much news to me. Do you have any sources that expand on this subject? I’d also be interested in any other “long arm” meddling that Algeria did in the last decades. I had the impression that it is a shy country in that respect, outside of its assistance during the 1973 war and whatever meagre assistance they were providing to African forces within the framework of the African union.
Thinking about it deeper, I think that the Kabyle separatist movement has a place in Algeria’s back of the mind – just like Spain with regards to its separatist movement. It would be hard politically to advocate independence of states like Kosovo while refusing the Kabyle’s separatists, whose views were quite loud at the start of the decade following the events of Black Spring 2001, so it does seem more logical for the country to follow the strict line you suggested.
December 10, 2009 at 10:28
alle
Houwari — Kabylie: Yes, that is in principle similar to Kosovo, although not in practice. There doesn’t seem to be much support for separatism in Kabylie (even if people loathe the government), in contrast to Kosovo, and there’s been no ethnic cleansing etc in Kabylie. But legally they could be quite parallell. You also have the potential for separatism in Touareg areas, with Libya always close by on the sidelines, even if it hasn’t been an issue so far.
About the Canary Islands movement, there’s a little on Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canary_Islands_Independence_Movement
Algeria’s interest in Canary Island Amazighité and independence was first rooted in some sort of anti-Spanish/anti-Fascist struggle, then revived as a tool in the Sahara conflict, then eventually dropped because it (a) wasn’t working and (b) Spain was extracting itself from conflict with POLISARIO and (c) it was just plain ridiculous.
I would not say Algeria was shy in supporting armed movements. Quite the contrary, during its ‘radical’ phase, even if it was never really involved in trying to actively steer the politics of militant groups the way eg. Libya and Syria were (POLISARIO is the exception). Both Ben Bella and Boumedienne hosted and supported Palestinian movements, and the first ever Palestinian military camps (for Fatah) were opened in Algeria by Ben Bella in the early 60s. Later Boumedienne would even allow Abu Nidal to have a presence in the country, even if I don’t know that there was any practical support given (Abu Nidal was a tool of Libya at that stage, and politically Algeria was always aligned with the PLO mainstream under Arafat). You also had various European revolutionaries and oddball American radicals (Tim Leary & Eldridge Cleaver) going to Algiers, and it was a pretty popular destination for hijacked aircraft for a while.
In Africa, it’s rare to find an anticolonial movement that didn’t have dealings with the Algerian security services: ANC, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO, MPAIGC, ZANU, and of course POLISARIO. They also helped relaying eg. Cuban support for southern African liberation movements, and in some cases provided military assistance directly — you’ll recall the reason Mandela was put in prison was that he was organizing camps for the ANC armed wing in Algeria.
So if Algerian support is perceived as having been modest on the economic/military level, I think that’s more because it was a relatively poor state far from the battlefield, and couldn’t have a really major impact even if it wanted. During the 60s & 70s, it was quite dedicated to backing radical movements, even if that radicalism trailed off with Chadli. And then there’s also the fact that Libya would always grab the headlines whatever Algeria did…
December 13, 2009 at 00:59
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