Elfahem Yefham. What a broken dialogue.

[...]

What has this background to do with censorship though? When Rachad’s website was censored several blogs and websites carried the story including mine, with a petition to oppose all forms of censorship. Replies were extremely distrutful and vehement. Hchicha, a famous Algerian blogger who blogs in French, had a Youtube video that denounced censorship in all forms. He was attacked mercilessly and had multiple video replies. He says he was swamped with angry emails. I received emails to the tune that I am an islamist in disguise for starting the petition and had to alter the text to make it generic.  “How dare you defend the rights of Islamists?” was their argument. These emails and Video replies were coming from people who, themselves, oppose the current regime to the core.

[...]

This brings me to the question: beyond the slogans and the principles, how far would you go in defending your political rival some fundamental human right, even if you know that the rival presents a substantial threat to your way of life? Upping the stakes once more,  what if even the values that you’re defending for them may be substantially jeopardised in case they win power?

I’ll debut these posts by celebrating the blossoming of many new Algerian blogs in English (this one being one of them):

• DZflickrs: fickr group posting images on Algeria. The first is pretty good.
• Narimane: an upcoming star! her first post is well worth the read - she embodies the typical experience of a new Algerian family in the midst of the civil war and economic crises by recalling her parents’ family.
• Patriotsonfire looks into Algerian demands for a French apology. He has a comprehensive timeline of the highlights of the two countries’ relations over the last decade. Zineddine Zidane and the football teams are happy to show a different perspective with a match in Algiers two days ago. The picture below speaks volumes.
• BentAljazair (daughter of Algeria) has more on the brain drain issue in reply to an earlier post in this blog – make sure to read the discussions in both blogs. The brain drain issue still interests Algerians and I suspect it always will for some time to come.
• No list on Algerian blogs is complete without Kal of The Moor Next Door. He has a post on the new cult of personality in Algeria. Algerians have always loathed personality cults with historical precedents since the FLN’s structure in the war of independence, the way they will respond to this will be interesting.

A research project in the UK looks into Algeria and the dynamics of post 1962 Algeria-France relations. Two new blogs were setup:

• Images of France and Algeria: with plans for an exhibition and a call for help.
• The cardographer: Algeria’s history and current events through photography and post cards.

Credit: Elkhabar

Ali Tounsi, Courtesy of El Moudjahid

What to make of Ali Tounsi’s assassination? In keeping with their tradition of misunderstanding Algeria’s politics, several western news outlets are either overstating or misunderstanding the impact of this event, e.g with regards to the fight on terrorism and the causes of the murder.

The abnormal about Ali Tounsi’s assassination is that it appears to be normal so far. Assassinations are always suspicious in Algerian circles: Mohamed Boudiaf, Abdelhaq Benhamouda, Matoub Lounes, and countless other deaths have been shrouded in mystery and conspiracy theories for good reason and with good evidence.

Chouaib Oultache

Ali Tounsi, though (pictured right), got gunned down by a trusted colleague, Lt Colonel Oultache Chouaib (pictured below), who he knew for years. Tounsi apparently pleaded for Oultache to return from retirement and head the new aerial police force a few years ago. Tounsi wanted to clamp down on corruption and identified Oultache as one of the corrupt, dismissing him a day before the assassination as reported by Ennahar. An easy explanation is that Oultache went berserk as he could not comprehend how Tounsi returned him to the force only to send him to the prison cell. So he shot the guy after a verbal confrontation.

Reports conflict as to what happened afterwards. Several newspaper websites fluctuated between various stories: first claiming that Tounsi himself shot him (unlikely), then there were reports that Oultache asked the secretary to invite other high ranking officers in an attempt to cause a ‘bloodbath’, but he got shot by a third unknown person. Finally they rested on the story that the perpetrator shot his chest trying to commit suicide. These conflicting accounts are still described in Echorouk’s main story. These variations are unsettling. I really want to believe that Oultache acted alone: after all his dismissal story is real.

All of this is happening in a background that is not reassuring. Rumours are rampant about a power struggle between the DRS (the security service) headed by the last bastions of the Algerian army and Bouteflika. In the run up to Bouteflika’s third term, in an effort to concentrate power in the presidency, he was successful in neutralising several key figures of the  army who have been in power behind the scene for years. The list includes Mohamed Lamari and Larbi Belkheir (who died a month ago). Bouteflika knew that nothing could stop the momentum to claim a third term, and his power has been worrying the intelligence service. Bouteflika’s popularity soured as the country got turned intro a construction site for multi billion dollar projects, such as the promised million apartments and the enormous east-west highway project.

So it was no surprise to many that the army and the DRS turned the tables on the civilian government and the corruption charges by taking the fight to the government itself using the same charges: several figures of the ministry of construction were arrested in 2009, and the CEO of Sontrach (the state oil company) got arrested along with several other people in the company . The investigations are reportedly being unusually carried by the DRS itself.

Ali Tounsi is usually thought to be firmly in the DRS camp. He was in the service for several years, most recently under its current head. I really want to believe that nothing is going on with his death, I’m literally trembling over the possibility of a power fight that would have spilled to this level. There is an uneasy silence in Algeria at the moment and the societal front is heated up with weekly reports of riots, Harga (illegal immigration) and continuing strikes in the education sector.

On the assassination, nothing much is known about Oultache Chouaib. I dug up the picture above by searching through Google’s archives of the police website. He is quoted in a Microsoft Vista study (watch as it will evaporate) touting Microsoft solutions for the 120000 man strong police force. It has been reported that he was a trusted colleague of Tounsi.

Ali Tounsi, the Police Force and Terrorism

Ali Tounsi garnered a reputation as a disciplinarian and won the admiration of a lots of Algerians as a strict Kheddam (serious worker). Indeed, as the police force got expanded over the last decade many Algerians saw it as a convenient employer to escape rampant unemployment, especially amongst the youth, so people looked up to him and his force as a potential source of Khoubza (bread – income).

Tounsi vowed to match the policemen/population ratio of western countries. He sought to enforce professional standards, revamping uniforms and sending out communiqués that enforce discipline in dealing with the public. He famously lashed out at policemen who were not using their shiny new white gloves. Several policemen friends attest to how he is universally respected and feared in police academies – trainee policemen train for months to produce the perfect march at graduation. He wanted to restore the reputation of the police as a lawful force in contrast to the tarnished Gendarmerie and Army. He wanted the police to strictly adhere to laws requiring judicial oversight over arrests and home raids.

Tounsi’s murder though will have virtually no impact on the fight on terrorism. During the civil war, the police had a key if secondary role in fighting terrorism (many terrorists initially regarded police as illegitimate targets). The fight has been shouldered by the army and the Gendarmerie, a French style highly mobile force that operates both in civilian centres as well as rural areas where they excel. In recent years, as terrorists confined themselves to the mountains the army took most of the responsibility , with the intelligence service reportedly looking to untangle the civilian cells after the recent bombings in Algiers. Most importantly, the police is a huge force, the head will be replaced quickly and normal operations will resume without much interruption.

Ali Tounsi’s death is only going to bolster his image as a martyr. The country’s biggest problem now is rampant corruption, and the official story is that the murderer was about to get convicted of corruption. The war on corruption in the country continues to take unexpected turns every few months.

Update: Also read Kal’s post on the murder.

Easterly argues that the greatest benefit is to the migrants themselves, who are often forgotten in the debate. This is true for the cream of Algerian skilled labour but the picture is very different for a large section of migrants. Most skilled Algerians with degrees fail to find skilled jobs in western countries [PDF UN Report]. Perceived racism and classism keeps a lot of Algerians in ghettos in France, inevitably many get forced to reside illegally in their target countries. This poses serious problems as it restricts their movement and often forces them underground.

A powerful argument for brain drain skeptics is remittances. Skilled labour sends large amounts of money back to their families. This, however, falls largely flat in the Algerian context because it is harmful in many more ways that it is beneficial.

First, oil rich Algeria is literally awash with foreign currency reserves. In fact, the country can’t spend the money fast enough to spur development precisely because there is not enough skilled labour and managerial acumen to conduct development. Multi billion projects are given to foreign consortiums such that hardly any transfer of skill or know-how occurs and labour is quickly imported to implement the projects.

Second, Algeria can be considered as a middle way country that is not on par with the poorest countries in the developing world. Remittances are spent either on properties or on imported products (The Algerian dream being the car and the house). In properties, remittances are spent on buying land, apartments, villas and commercial enterprises creating an inflation bubble that effectively forces the whole property market beyond the reach of the local population and places it at the hands of migrants and wealthy businessmen. The foreign currency monies get recycled in the black market for ever-increasing property prices or back abroad to get consumer goods. In the end, remittances push prices up and are spent on imported (often luxurious) products with little benefit to the local economy.

Easterly also argues that the brain drain phenomenon inevitably leads to “brain circulation”, where skilled labour and intellectuals often return to their host countries or act as role models for their compatriots back home. The second point is substantial as many Algerians look up to high achievers in western countries, but the result is the belief that it is by leaving the country that anyone attains any success. The first point is a noble long term goal, but it has never materialised in countries like Algeria. The immigration flow of skilled labour has never been reversed at any point in the last century. After the first few years in immigration, very few first generation migrants return and the return of second generation and above migrants is simply unheard of.

The simple reason that gets ignored is that conditions in the source country are not appealing enough for skilled labour, a chicken and egg cyclic problem that is extremely intractable. More brain drain leads to worse conditions at home leading to more drain brain and so on. In the end, very few skilled people are left to have a good development vision for the country.  Labour movement (not unlike goods, a tasteless comparison I know) strictly follows a free market system despite the occasional lip service to nationalism. Emigrants naturally look for their own well-being and their career prospects.

Simplistic measures such as blocking immigration are simply inhumane and border on the criminal. The problem should be tackled right at the source country to create an atmosphere that is encouraging. This, indeed, is seemingly impossibly difficult despite its apparent simplicity. Source and target countries should work together to encourage knowledge transfer. A possible solution is temporary assignments. Skilled labour in private and public bodies can be encouraged to take temporary multi month or multi year assignments in the source country. Immigration rules should be changed to make this possible because working Visa rules make the choice of the country of work a life long commitment for a lot of migrants.

In the end, the problem of brain drain is real and harmful in Algeria. Less work should be made to vilify emigrants and coerce them into feelings of guilt but more, internationally, should be done to encourage true brain circulation.

Violence is no new-comer to football, one may accept that occasionally a player short circuits his brain at the heat of the moment. Famous hot shots like Beckam, Zidane, Drogba, Rooney and Ronaldo all had their moments of anger that ended in red cards. In the last Algeria-Egypt game one player (Halliche) could be said to have been red carded wrongly, but the other two were well deserved by Chaouchi and Belhadj. Not only were they well deserved, CAF thinks the referee was rather too lenient on Chaouchi after he head butted him and have started procedures for disciplining him for not being harsh enough.

Surveying the post match Algerian media though, there is something to be said about a weird tendency to view such anger and  violence in a favourable light. As in one is being tough defending their “right” and standing up for one’s “honour”. After the day of the match, one popular newspaper carried the main title to the tune of “It’s OK, you’ve shown you were men “, the other carried the title “The champions are returning home”. There is no hint of criticism for the violent conduct whatsoever, and all reports concentrated on the referee’s mistakes. On the contrary, they were rather showing some disguised praise for “standing up” as in this is the proper way to act!. Only a week after a game did any newspaper bother to report that Assad, the former national team player, opined that the team had serious trouble maintaining its discipline.

More troublesome to me is the fact that this view is shared with quite a number of Algerians. In a couple of discussions with fellow Algerian citizens I just couldn’t put across the idea that referee mistakes are no excuse for going ballistic. In both cases I won the argument by stating the Ivorian attitude when their goal was mistakenly outlawed in the last 10 minutes of the extended 120 minutes game. Had it been a mistakenly outlawed Algerian goal in the same situation, I would’ve expected blood to flow.

In the Algeria-Egypt match, Halliche may have been wrongly red carded. Chaouchi though should be punished by the Algerian FAF for headbutting the referee, and I’m more leaning towards also punishing Belhadj. This is not just a matter of nationalism or football pride. The team is being watched by millions of Algerians. It’s an opportunity to send the signal that violence is by no means acceptable at all. Granted we’re proud of having given France the boot by the strength of the arm (and a big helping of diplomacy and political acumen in the actions of the Algerian Government in exile and people like Chanderli in New York), but we’ve got to confess that violence has been our nightmare ever since. We’re barely able to sit down and communicate thoughts and share opinions in a civilised way – most major reforms happened after much blood spilling.

We could do well by following the advice of what Algerians consider the finest human being:

The strong man is not the one who wrestles well but the strong man is the one who controls himself when he is in a fit of rage

as is reported from the prophet Muhammad.

Bouteflika must be aware of his limits here. Although he tried to strip away political power from the military with some success at the top owing largely to the ageing and death of many of the army’s figureheads (and failing at delegating this political power back to democratic institutions I might add), he completely failed at challenging the grip of the ruling class on the socio-economic realms of Algeria.  The country is run by a self-perpetuating system whose members are informally formed by a number of people in power, wealthy individuals, army officials in the various provinces as well as historical figures.

This class (henceforth called the ruling class) carefully keeps itself in power by only accepting loyal people to command its sphere of influece. To regenerate itself and keep outsiders away, this ruling class carefully relies on loyalty and other constructs such as hereditary ascension, historical status and language. Sons of people in power are routinely sent abroad to study in prestigious western universities on state funds and come back to rule the country. Some sons of veterans are often catapulted into positions of responsibility using their historical credentials after testing their loyalty. There is very little in this system for someone who doesn’t fully communicate in French (a mostly élite language nowadays that serves to perpetuate this political divide). Networking opportunities occur at some of the numerous veteran organisations and party activities (FLN/RND) where new blood is found, groomed and trained in various positions up the power ladder.

Furthermore, this system keeps away potential knowledgeable people who may have claim to positions of responsibility based on merit*. Endless hoops of bureaucracy and corruption keep those pesty knowledgeable people away by forcing them into wasting hours of productive time ferrying papers and applications back and forth various inefficient bureaucratic state institutions (banks, universities, government offices, the judicial system, etc). The result is a frustrated worn down citizen who can’t get anything done without resorting to pleading for help from the powers that be. Combined with further discouraging facts, such as the abnormally low wages for positions of intellect (University positions for example), and the impossibility of exploiting one’s entrepreneurial spirits (endless barriers and state controls), the tired worn down citizen just cannot wait before a Visa for a foreign western country is stamped on his passport to get out of the country, thereby enabling him to pursue his ambitions and fulfilling the desire of the regime to get rid of him.

As to the masses of ordinary Amar and Khadidja Algerians, there will be a glass ceiling that they just can’t break. They are always busy trying to solve the primitive problems of their daily lives such as getting an apartment (from the government), a car (loan helped by the government) or a job (over 50% state), thus kept in perpetual need of the government. Their rights are all but taken away (no demonstrations, no freedom of speech, endless trials against dissidents and journalists, a self censured cultural scene, etc).

With this brilliant system, the ruling class keeps itself in power, sends potential challengers away (intellectuals), and keeps an oppressed population from whose votes they continuously claim legitimacy. At the top of the food chain powerful regional officials and wealthy people hide behind façades of national and private organisations  (with names of the form “Houwari and Company Ltd”). These companies often gain exclusive licenses to operate activities of importation, transportation and safe investments to exclusive markets of that nature.

The last president who truly wanted to confront this powerful self perpetuating system was gunned down and bombed by his own bodyguard 5 months into his presidential term. In various memorable speeches, Mohamed Boudiaf expressed his dismay and frustration at the way positions of responsibility are offered based on shabby deals rather than on merit. Owing to his disconnect from the ruling class since the Algerian independence, he spoke in simple terms without grandiose statements or hollow visionary ideas, and with the same street language and words that ordinary Algerians use daily to vent their angst at their government. He fully understood the frustration of Algerians and often spoke with emotion at the state of a country he helped liberate from the shackles of colonialism. The consequence for him was sadly the coffin.

Before him and after his death nobody could really confront this corrupt system. Instead, successive governments have pledged to combat corruption and have done mostly smoke screen measures. This last wave of arrests from Sonatrach falls under this habit of fighting the symptom of the problem (corrupt officials) and not the actual problem (a largely non transparent ruling class). Algerians remember that every few years (or months) serious scandals of that sort erupt. Only recently arrests were made at the ministry of construction concerning the multi billion highway project. A few years ago the Khalifa scandal shook the country with its magnitude: a complete conglomerate formed of a bank, an airline, car renting, insurance etc turned out to be a hot air operation to rob the country of billions of funds. Did anything change after that? no.

Beyond the political readings and the supposed power struggles between the DRS and Bouteflika/Amar Ghoul on the one hand, or the sincerity of the desire of the country to rid itself of corruption on the other hand, the fact is that the corrupt system will always breed more corrupt people and scandals of this sort will always happen.

[*The tactic was best described by the Egyptian Nobel prize winner Ahmed Zewail when describing the political class of his country (the two countries, Algeria and Egypt, are evidently alike in many ways): positions of responsibility are offered to people of "Wala'" (loyalty) as opposed to people of "Ma'rifa" (Knowledge and merit).]

On the historical context, during France’s occupation of Algeria France has deliberately tried to culturally and religiously influence the local Muslim population while maintaining a quasi-apartheid rule that disadvantages local Muslims who opposed assimilation. The Muslim population responded by growing ever more suspicious of what they thought as thinly veiled attempts at converting them to Christianity. Several laws sought to define multiple classes of citizenry based on religion: Napoleon’s 1965 law and the 1870 Crémieux decree both set limits on the rights of Algerians based on religion. These laws denied Algerians fully citizenry unless they denounced their Muslim religion while granting local Christians and Jews full citizenship . Such mixing of religiosity with citizenship would later influence inter-religious events between the three religious groups for the rest of the colonial period.

Algerians though would have none of it as very few people accepted conversion. Community leaders sensed the possible breakup of the Algerian community were a large number of Algerians convert en masse, so they wrote and fought relentlessly against these laws.  The famous Algerian scholar and head of the Association of Algerian Scholars Abdelhamid Bin Badis wrote that accepting the French Citizenship amounts to treason. He then issued his famous poem, whose first lines assert the Muslim and Arab dimensions of the local population. An Amazigh himself, he regarded Islam and the Arab language as a force that would unite Algerians and assert their indigenous identity whatever their ethnic background*. Ibn Badis, his association and the multitude of cultural output they worked for would later be a contributing force in the thought that led to the Algerian Independence War 1954-1962.

During that war, the Kabyle region played a central role in the resistance movement in the Djurdjura mountains. The French attempted to break this resistance militarily and by exploiting the stereotypical Amazigh-Arab conflict (This practice of exploiting tribal conflicts had netted the French fruits in some parts of the country, such as in Arris, Batna). Again the Christian religion was always viewed susceptibility as it was seen as being rammed down their throats to break the lines of the Algerian revolution, and worse, establish a separate Kabyle political entity that would break the Algerian soil into two easily manageable halves west and south-east of the Kabyle region.

Since then, Algerians developed what could  be called as simply, frankly, a phobia towards the Christian religion especially in the Kabyle region. Far from the typical view generally held outside Algeria and sometimes inside Algeria outside Kabylia, the Kabyle region harbours in its mountainous ranges some of the most devout Muslims in Algeria.  Béjaïa is fondly remembered a centre for Islamic scholarship and political influence during the Hammadid dynasty and the Islamic School of Tizi-Ouzou produces a considerable number of  Imams for mosques all over the country. Muslim leaders inside the Kabyle region and outside it view any Christian activity as another French attempt at breaking up the region and exploiting it for political purposes.

It is important to note that pre-existing Christians (a considerable number left over from the Algerian war until the Algerian civil war 1991) continued to live relatively in peace in their teaching and administrative posts. The sensitivity is towards Christian missionaries that seek new converts, often exploiting their poverty and disillusion with governments that denied their cultural roots and failed to develop one of the most densely populated regions in Algeria. The missionaries are thus always viewed with great suspicion (Sidenote:  a cursory look at some of the Christian websites discovers such gems as “The North African countries are some of the last great havens for Satan, they must be converted!”). With ever increasing sensationalised reports of Muslims turning to Christianity the chaotic response of successive governments provided further fuel to the fire.

Far from having a clear policy towards these missionaries, Algerian governments and ministers of religious affairs often acted emotionally and showed a response that can be characterised as wholly anti-Christian, rather than just anti missionary attempts at exploiting the Kabyle problems. The Algerian Muslim population is not as homogeneous as it is often portrayed. Historically, significant Zaouia Sufi and Ibadi orders always existed. Currently, Muslims can be categorised in multiple currents: in addition to the historical groups, new radical, Salafist and Muslim brotherhood groups emerged. The safest group for the government are some of the mild Sufi Zaoui orders: largely apolitical and confined to ritual practices of the religion. These orders now control the ministry of religious affairs and many of its mosques throughout the country. Given that this current was at forefront of the fight for Algerian identity during the colonialism years since 1830, it should come at no surprise that it acted in continuation with the same mentality. Worse, electorally discredited governments and ministers of religious affairs felt under pressure to confirm their adherence to Islam by mindlessly oppressing Christian groups.

The government’s response to the recent burning of the Christian apartment in Tizi-Ouzou is a perfect example of this behaviour. Rather than attempting to calm down the local population and avoid further religious violence, the government ignored the criminal act of burning down the apartment and concentrated on criminally suing the Christian owner for not having a license to use the premises for Christian congregations (his fault). The act sends the message that it is acceptable for citizens to take the law into their hands and burn down Christian places, putting aside the question of whether licensing laws are adequate in the first place (they are, given that they equally apply, by the text of the law, to Muslims places of worship). This behaviour fuels feelings of religious oppression in the Christian community and encourages further provocations.

The religious conflicts in Algeria that appeared as of late are evidently quite complex and require great political skill to resolve in the future. No simple formula will be a solution. Calming down feelings of hatred and phobia will takes years of conditioning the local population that it is acceptable to have a Christian as your neighbour and that not all Christians are French neo-colonialists. The government’s response to feelings of sociocultural and socioeconomic disillusion should be through active economic and cultural development throughout the region and not through populist battles against groups of Christians. Real attempts at exploiting the Kabyle region for political purposes should be fought politically, not religiously.

[* It is sad that Ibn Badis's poem was later used in the independence years to justify denying the Amazigh dimension of the Algerian identity. Such an explanation ignores the historical context of Ibn Badis's poem that sought to unite Algerians against a common danger. Ibn Babdis was always proud of his Amazigh roots and would be greatly troubled were he to learn how his poem was used.]

Yennayer is an Amazigh celebration in Algeria and other places where there is a significant berber population – it is currently under way as it is usually celebrated between 12-14 January of each year. My admittedly quick lazy searching did not prove me otherwise:  I wonder whether it is the oldest celebrated day in the world, is it? It has been celebrated since the Amazighs’ victory over Ramses III in Tlemcen in 950 BC, 2960 years ago. Read more about it here and here. The French Wikipedia has a more comprehensive entry in French.

The Kabyle region have been campaigning for a long time for an official recognition of the day. Recognising it as an important cultural event in Algeria is surely a great asset to the country.

Click for Image Source

Tagged: Algeria, Celebration, Pharaos, Ramses III, World Record, Yennayer ]]> http://algerianreview.wordpress.com/2010/01/13/yennayer-as-the-oldest-celebrated-day/feed/ 6 houwarid yennayer http://algerianreview.wordpress.com/2010/01/09/algeria-cybercrime-law/ http://algerianreview.wordpress.com/2010/01/09/algeria-cybercrime-law/#comments Sat, 09 Jan 2010 22:28:14 +0000 Houwari http://algerianreview.wordpress.com/?p=303 ]]> After the censorship case that was discovered last week, I went back to the text of the law 09-04 combating cybercrime. The law was made official on the 5th August 2009. The text of the law makes for some worrying reading and grants unprecedented powers to the state, unprecedented even in other countries. Multi national search engines providers such as Microsoft and Google may fall foul of the law if they operate in Algeria (MS does, Google owns the Google.dz domain but does not have a subsidiary there yet). Most worryingly, the law literally permits the state to spy and hack onto websites that it deems in breach of its vague cybercrime definitions without prior consent from a competent judge in some cases. However, the text of the law does not, to my knowledge, grant the state the power to censor any website that it wishes without permission from a judge.

Search engine providers and ISPs fall under the definition given in article 1 D: “Any entity that processes or stores computer data [that is in breach of the law]“.  This applies to Microsoft, Google and other engines that store offending website caches and provide search engine results.

Articles 3, 4 and 7 give the state powers to eavesdrop and censor Internet content and detail cases when that is required, but the articles are explicit in that eavesdropping and censorship are only permissible with a renewable 6 month mandate by a competent judge. It is not clear how the Rachad website was censored.  The Rachad movement is not very famous in Algeria, and some of its leaders are quite unpopular being former FIS members. Its mission is the “peaceful overthrow of this illegitimate government” but I have a hard time believing that Algerians will flock to them en masse. It is a pity how a group of activists in exile with a website and a YouTube channel can easily be regarded as a “threat to national security”. The state is effectively giving publicity and recognition to the movement by this act.

I could not find any judicial decision that declared the Rachad movement a threat. There was a case in April 2009 where a man was sentenced to 18 months in prison for writing “threatening content” on Rachad’s Internet Forums (The case was dealt with before the introduction of this law).

Article 5 is worrying. It grants the state the power to remotely hack and spy onto computer systems if required by a judge, but other websites and systems can be hacked into “quickly” if they are “connected” to the offending website. In effect, this grants the state the power to hack into any website in Algeria. The text of the law is explicit in that a judge should seek cooperation by other countries for websites that are hosted outside Algeria, but any website should remain vigilant just in case. I hope the irony of a law that forbids cybercrime for citizens and effectively legitimises it for the state is not lost here.

Articles 10 and 11 require  “Internet providers” to store all communications and identifying information for a minimum of a year. The text of the law and the definitions given in article 2 give the impression that this applies to Internet café owners. Internet Cafés are the main venue for Internet users in Algeria, with some statistics putting the number of Internet cafés at 30000.

Article 13 and 14 introduce a new body for combating cybercrime, presumably this is the body that enforces censorship. The text of the law is not clear as to the nature of this body, what department it is under and what are its specific powers.

This whole law is in clear breach of several citizen rights as given in the constitution, including article 36 (explicit freedom of expression), article 39 (explicit right to privacy) and article 41 (freedom of assembly and speech). There is a state of emergency in force since 1992, so in practice the state can offend any of these rights willy-nilly with or without the new law.

Finally, please read and sign the Anti Censorship Petition if you are worried about these developments.

The atmosphere at the queue was unbearably tense. Security guards kept going back and forth moving people to interview rooms. The hall had numerous windows with one-way mirrors suggesting that all passengers are being watched. I waited patiently for my turn and made sure that I stare at no guard or mirror  – yes, I was quite scared. Being of mixed Berber and Arab heritage, I look unmistakably middle eastern, brown of the North African variety, but not necessarily like the 9/11 hijackers. But you never know, we always all get lumped in the same bag, even Sikh and Indian people were racially abused and shot at after 9/11.

At the end of the queue stood a steward directing passengers to one of several border control desks as they become available. When it was my turn he looked at my posture, looked at my hand holding the green Algerian passport, and asked me to come to a small queue he held behind him. I discovered that I was joining several other  passengers all of the same prototype: young, brown and male. An old Algerian in a suit in the “normal” queue got furious at the steward and asked him to clarify the treatment. I understood from the gestures of the steward and what few words I could pick up that it is “policy”. The old man still moved around angrily demanding answers and asked for the manager. I thought he was a noble and brave man but I was scared that he will get rounded up for defending us.

Meanwhile, our queue moved unbearably slow. Out of all the control desks one was dedicated to us. Once my turn came, the steward pointed me to the desk, at which sat a typical old British man with white hair. The old man lifted his forearm up, then with his back hand facing me he gestured with the index finger for me to come to the desk. The gesture was clearly made to intimidate me, but having the typical Algerian hot blood his manners made me more confident and gave me a rush of adrenaline to prepare for a shouting match that I thankfully restrained myself from getting into.

At the desk, language problems immediately manifested themselves. He looked at me in the eye from above his spectacles as he asked me something in English which I spoke very little of, so I just replied with my broken English: “I do not understand” in a je m’en fous way. I could hear him mutter a frustrated “Jesus Christ” as he held his head in his hand, flipping my passport with the other. Upon realising I was Algerian he asked me in French “Where is your Visa?”,  I spoke French so I gave him the page number. Then came the flood of questions: how long are you staying? where are you going to study? for how long? where will you be staying? Who is waiting for you at the airport? do you have a French passport? and so on. Flipping through my passport, he phoned somewhere, from his gestures I assumed that he was establishing the authenticity of the passport. I stood there for over 15 minutes, then he stamped on my passport and asked me to join an adjacent room for a “medical” check.

Another queue at the room, again those being queued were of the same prototype. The “medical” check involved another examination of the passport and asking a few of the previously asked questions. The last question was whether I took vaccinations as a child, to which I replied in the affirmative. At baggage control, somehow I was again singled for a “random” check, which was quite thorough. I had a small bottle of high quality honey confiscated and was referred to have a “check” on my file in case the same “offence” was committed again, but somehow another staff asked me to just pack up and go, finally into the country. All in all, getting through border control took 3 hours of stress, and I am told I had it easy.

Throughout the next eight years I was more or less subjected to the same treatment (minus the special queues) every time I flew into Heathrow. Flying out always had me removing my belt, my shoes, nearly routinely getting singled out on the side for a thorough body check. Once I was pulled into a room where I had a border control officer “quiz” me about various subjects: What I thought about Islam and Bin Laden and other questions of that sort. I could barely hide a mixed face of frustration and laughter throughout the “interview”.

This profiling is, to me, too real not to assume it is not systematic. Some random checks may pick up the odd non prototype conforming passenger, but I have a hard time believing that all old ladies, young girls and businessmen were subjects to the same treatment. Therefore forgive me for chuckling and sadly shaking my head whenever one of these racial profiling debates flare up. In a discussion with some of my English white friends, some think that it is not a big deal and that I am not being targeted. This makes almost pull the lethal “but you’ve never been black or brown so you don’t know” card.

The profiling is already done in practice, and is undoubtedly codified in some internal memos as recently discovered in the United States. The question should not merely be whether racial profiling should be done or not, but whether 8 years (or perhaps more) of it have prevented terrorist attacks and whether the moral costs justify the small or non existant security gain. It need not be said that for all the profiling that I and people like me were subjected to in the UK, it is British men that caused the 7/7 bombings in London. These people would normally whiz through the specially marked EU border control desks at Heathrow. Any suggestion of racial profiling for British people in the UK or for Americans in the US will be laughed out of court. For a would be terrorist, the problem of getting citizenship of the target country of attack is a side issue. History shows us that no amount of bureaucratic paperwork prevents ideologically motivated attacks. Security measures are just a smoke screen that serve to discourage the target countries from seriously thinking about their acts on the international stage and the hate they generate.

But here is the cracker though: suppose that racial profiling was “officially” approved, and that the next attacks (god forbid) are committed by a non racially profiled attacker. The embarrassment this potential scenario would cause to the authorities is unthinkable. It remind me of the embarrassment, frustration and total loss that the French experienced through the Algerian War 1954-1962.

At the start of that war, Algerians took to the mountains to fight against the French military. The French stepped up security measures and installed checkpoints everywhere. The Algerian fighters countered by wearing their wives’ clothes to get past the controls. Then in the Battle of Algiers, key to the Algerian attacks were Yassef’s girls, totally european’ised and blending well with the white Pierds Noirs, some of them even took a habit of flirting with security guards as they got though their checkpoints to plant bombs everywhere in Algiers. When the French lost the war they discovered that all along numerous white French and Pierds Noirs, men and women alike helped the Algerians all along and were instrumental in moving key Algerian fighters around the country and for organising money collections for them.

The Algerian authorities have started an Internet filter, and inaugurated the year 2010 by a first ban on an opposition website (More details in this post). Today it’s this opposition movement, tomorrow it can be your blog or website, and some day it may even be Youtube or Facebook.

Clearly it is time to actively fight against this blatant act of censorship. We call on all Algerian internet citizens around the globe to participate in the campaign for freedom of speech and against censorship in the country. Venues of action include:

• Petition:

Sign the Petition against Internet Censorship in Algeria. Email it around to your friends. The petition’s text is pasted below.

• Internet Activism:

Post about the petition on your Blog. If you have graphics capabilities, you can create banners and graphics so that various websites and Blogs can use them.

• Social Networks:

Raise awarness about the issue. Post on Facebook, MySpace and any other social network or Internet forum. The more Algerians know about this, the better.

Use Twitter‘s power to spread the petition. Use “#Algeria” or “#Algerie” tags.

• Other banned websites:

Keep a watch on other opposition websites in case they get censored. Report all censorship cases to HerdictWeb. The more reports, the better. There may be cases where only a select of ISP’s censor a website.

• Working around the filter:

If you are inside Lebled (Algeria), use this feedburner link to read some of the banned website website’s entries. Spread the link around. The authorities need to realise that banning a website is counter productive and will actually make it more famous.

Petition text:
(Texte en français ci-dessous – English text below)
العربية

خلال سنة 2009 ذكرت الصحف المحلية الجزائرية أن السلطات الجزائرية تستعد لوضع برنامج حجب مواقع  إنترنت لمكافحة “الجريمة الحاسوبية” و المواقع “الإرهابية” و “الإباحية”. ويجري حاليا إعداد القوانين لجعل التحايل على الحجب جريمة جنائية.

وقد تلقى مستخدمو الإنترنت الجزائريين مثل هذه الأخبار بقلق، خوفا من أن يستخدم الحجب لأغراض سياسية. وجاء الدليل الأول في الفاتح من يناير/جانفي 2010، إذ تم حجب مواقع لمنظمات معارضة سلمية لا تندرج تحت الفئات المذكورة أعلاه.

تحدد السلطات قائمة المواقع المحجوبة دون استشارة متصفحي الإنترنت. وتخضع لرقابة هيئة لم يفصح عنها بعد، وعملية الرقابة غير شفافة، إذ لا تُقدّم مبررات لحجب موقع، أو وسائل للاحتجاج عليها ومعارضتها.

مما يعني أن الحكومة ستستعمل الحجب لأغراض سياسية لمنع المواقع المعارضة لها، والتي تنشر أفكار مخالفة لها.

إننا ندين بشدة هذه الممارسة التعسفية التي تعتبر خرقا واضحا لمبادئ حرية التعبير وحرية المعلومات كما تحددها المادة 19 من ” اﻟﻌﻬﺪ الدولي الخاص بالحقوق المدنية والسياسية” ، الذي وقّعت عليه الجزائر يوم 10 ديسمبر 1968 وصدّقت عليه في 12 سبتمبر 1989.

إن الدولة الجزائرية و الشعب الجزائري يطمحان إلى المثل العليا  “كالحرية” و ” الديمقراطية “، القيم التي ضحى من أجلها آباؤنا وأجدادنا منذ عقود، والرقابة على الإنترنت هو انتهاك صارخ لهذه القيم و يجب أن يتوقف.

Français

Au cours de l’année 2009, la presse locale algérienne a rapporté que les autorités algériennes préparaient un filtre Internet afin de combatre le “cybercrime”, et les sites “terroristes” et “pornographiques”. Des lois sont actuellement à l’état de projets afin de classer comme crime le contournement du filtre.

Les internautes algériens ont reçu cette nouvelle avec inquiétude, craignant que le filtre ne soit utilisé à des fins politiques. La preuve est faite le 1er janvier 2010. En ce premier jour de l’année, on a découvert que des sites Internet d’une organisation d’opposition pacifique ont été bloqué en Algérie.  Ces sites n’entrent dans aucune des catégories mentionnées ci-dessus.

Par sa nature, la liste du filtre des sites Internet bannnis sera établie par l’Etat sans consultation préalable des internautes. Les sites sont ainsi censurés par un corps de censeurs, non encore révélé. Le processus de censure n’est pas transparent. Il n’y a pas de justification donnée pour bannir les sites et il n’y a aucun moyen de contester la mise au ban.

Donc, il est évident que les sites bannis seront déterminés par le gouvernement pour des raisons politiques. Le gouvernement utilisera le filtre pour bannir les idées dissidentes et d’oppositions.

Nous condamnons fermement cette pratique car il est clair que cela est un manquement aux principes de libertés d’expression et d’information comme prescrit par l’article 19 du Pacte International relatif au Droits Civils et Politiques signé par l’Algérie le 10 décembre 1968 et ratifié le 12 septembre 1989.

L’Etat Algérien et le peuple Algérien aspirent aux hautes valeurs que sont la liberté et la démocratie, valeurs qui ont été défendues par nos pères et nos grands-pères pendant des décennies. La censure d’Internet est un manquement clair à ces valeurs, qui doit cesser.

English

During the year 2009 the Algerian local press reported that the Algerian authorities are preparing an Internet filter to combat “Cybercrime” , “Terrorist” and “pornographic” websites. Laws are being prepared to make circumventing the filter a criminal offence.

Algerians Internet users have received such news with anxiety, fearing that the filter will be used for political purposes. The evidence came on the 1st January 1st 2010. On the first day of the year, it was discovered that websites of a peaceful opposition movement have been blocked in Algeria. These websites do not fall under the categories mentioned above.

By its nature, the filter’s list of banned websites will be determined by the state without consulting Internet users. Websites are censored by a yet unannounced censorship body. The censorship process is not transparent. There is no reason given for banning websites, and there is no way to contest a ban.

It is evident that banned websites will be determined by the government for political reasons. The government will use the filter to ban opposition and dissident views.

We strongly condemn this practice as it is a clear breach of the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of information as determined by article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by Algeria on 10 December 1968 and ratified on 12 September 1989.

The Algerian state and the Algerian people have strong aspirations for the values of freedom and democracy, values that have been fought for by our fathers and grand fathers for decades. Internet censorship is a clear breach of these values and should be stopped.

Petition:

—

Nous, les soussignés, tant à titre personnel, qu’en tant qu’organisations, nous nous opposons à la tentative de censure d’Internet par le gouvernement algérien. Nous demandons qu’aucun site ne soit interdit pour raisons arbitraires ou politiques.

Nous demandons instamment aux autorités de se concentrer sur le renforcement de la faible infrastructure de communication et nous encourageons les citoyens à participer au débat public en utilisant Internet.

Le peuple algérien mérite un réseau Internet fiable, libre et non-censuré.

—

We, the undersigned, individuals and organisations, oppose the Algerian government’s attempt at Internet censorship. We ask that no website should be banned for arbitrary or political reasons.

We urge the Algerian authorities to concentrate on strengthening the weak communications infrastructure and we encourage Algerians to actively participate in the civil discource using the Internet.

The Algerian people deserve a competent, free and uncensored Internet

Rachad Movement: Annoying Enough!

With the start of the year 2010, there are reports that the first political Internet website to be censored in Algeria is rachad.org. Le Quotidien D’Algerie discovered this today. It was verified by this blog and others. The website appears in Google search results, but upon clicking it the web browser displays an innocent looking error. It is not clear when the website was censored, or if this is the only censored website so far or. It is also not clear how the filter is implemented.

The website in question is that of the Rachad Movement, a loose opposition organisation in exile formed by a mix of former diplomats, ex-civil servants, journalists and members of the now banned Islamist party FIS. The movement campaigns for a peaceful overthrow of the current regime.  The movement’s figurehead is Mohamed Larbi Zitout, a former diplomat who fled after claiming that the Army has a hand in the massacres of the civil war. Zitout is a regular commentator in Arab and Western news stations and a staunch critic of the government. Last month he broke the rumour that Algeria has accepted temporary American military stations, a rumour vehemently denied by the Algerian state and AFRICOM – this is probably what annoyed the authorities enough.

This blog covered the legal framework that the authorities have been preparing to create an internet filter and to make circumventing it a crime in itself in a previous post. The filter has been presented as an effort to combat “cybercrime”, extremist and pornographic websites. But in keeping with their tradition, predictably the authorities started using its powers to crack down on political websites. In the same way, the authorities uses its control of the media sphere to forbid private stations and the state owned printing companies to intimidate private newspapers.

No political blogger or internet activist has been directly imprisoned or sued by the state so far. There was one civil case against Abdessalam Baroudi, the author of bilad 13, for a (brilliant) satirical post comparing the local religious affairs director with al-Sistani. The case was dismissed on grounds of freedom of expression.

Last week, in its latest report on Internet censorship the Cairo based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) has rated Algeria as one of the “best countries dealing with the internet”, together with Lebanon. Apparently the praise has unsettled some backwards thinking bureaucrats. As suspected, the absence of censorship up to now is not evidence of love for freedom of expression, it is the sad product of incompetence mixed with the embarrassingly low Internet penetration in Algeria by the region’s standards.

So this is the first banned website so far, I suspect that Algérie-politique and the other popular opposition websites will soon follow. Rachad has not reached critical mass in Algeria yet, but the state might be shooting itself in the foot here and spreading the word. So pass this news on, more Algerians should be aware of what they are not allowed to read!

Image courtesy of L'équipe

Zineddine Zidane, the French footballer of Algerian origin has recently visited the Algerian training camp in Southern France to support the team after spending his career as a French player. His visit comes at a time when he is sharply criticising the French team and its sub-optimal performance in the qualification stages. He still commands the respect and affinity of both peoples across the Mediterranean. Zidane is among a rare breed in this regard: Zidane’s coming to peace with his dual Algerian French identity was not easy. Events that happened during his career highlight the long held question that has yet to be answered for good: what is an Algerian-French and can there be one?

The two countries, Algeria and France, are not strangers to enmity. After a bitterly fought war and 132 years of colonialism, Algerian gained its independence amid cries of triumphalism and anti-French feelings. There were nuggets of Algerians who identified themselves as French throughout that era, Ferhat Abbas declared that “France is me” in 1936 as he tried to theorise a framework where a civilised Algeria is part of France, but he abandoned that route and joined the resistance later in despair. Some Algerians fought with the French against Nazi Germany forces in WWII and gained French citizenship along with a few who were accepted as part of a naturalisation scheme. Thousands of Algerians fled the country in the aftermath of the war, dubbed “Harkis”: Algerians who collaborated with the French against the resistance.

Harkis were considered the lowest form of life by Algerians after Independence, and they struggled in France, forming the bulk of  “les banlieus”: deprived ghettos where poverty and unemployment run rife. Zidane was born in such an environment in Marseille, so he suffered greatly in his early life as a French. His parents were accused of being Harkis (Harki is the ultimate street insult in Algeria today), a charge he had to live with and vehemently deny for many years during his career.

Today, Harkis and other Algerian dwellers of les banlieues still live with the lost feeling of not being French enough to get jobs and opportunities.  Algerian immigrants and their sons are still the favourite target for French politicians: current president Sarkozy infamously described them as “filth”. The current “debate” about “French values” is seen by many as a charge against these people. Recently a minister declared that “Muslims should dress better, find jobs and stop using slang and wearing baseball caps backward.” . For many French Algerians it seems that nothing they can do can change this treatment: Rumours ran wild when it was suspected that Jacque Chiraq, the then French president, only coldly shook hands with Zidane after the world cup win of 1998: supposedly Chiraq wanted to send a signal.  During his career, Zidane was always a favourite target of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National: The French team is not French enough, they would routinely charge.

Across the pond, culturally Algeria is still very much tied to France. Algerian literature is bilingual, and for many years the French side was arguably winning. The administration still uses French as the main language despite years of Arabisation efforts and laws, a fact easily verifiable by surveying the current government websites.  France remains the favourite destination of Algerian intellectuals. Yet, the issue of Algerians who hold the French citizenship remains a hot populist issue in Algerian politics: there is a feeling that they shouldn’t be trusted or given high civil posts. Others, like the former Algerian prime minister Abdelhamid Brahimi conjure that Algeria has been ruled by a “French cultural army” that was prepared an implanted before France left Algeria, and that this army keeps the country under French influence.

So it seems that in both countries the dual Algerian-French identity has repeatedly been a victim to a bloody history and decades of populism, chauvinism and sometimes outright fascism and racism. When in France, few Algerian-French openly celebrate their Algerian ancestry in their professional life, when in Algeria, an even fewer number admit that they hold French passports. This affects a large number of people: on paper, there is no shortage of people who hold or who are entitled to a dual Algerian French dual citizenship. There are 3 million by some estimates.

But there is hope that this seemingly contradictory identity can be some day fully accepted at least in Algeria. In the current Algerian football team that Zidane visited, nearly all of the players hold a second citizenship, mostly French. Top team players who became household names after the recent qualification to the world cup, such as Ziani, Antar Yahia and Matmour,  were all born and raised in France. Perhaps Football will be the venue through which Algeria will learn to accept that Algerians who live in France can be a great asset in their efforts towards modernisation and development.

El Mouhtarem,  Algeria’s most famous political blogger (pen name) has created a storm by claiming that Echorouk owes 103 billion centimes (around $15 million) to the national printing companies. ElWatan, a francophone newspaper, picked up on the story and claimed that they verified it by a second anonymous source. The day after, Echorouk reacted furiously. They published a multi page rebuttal with scans of letters from the printing companies.  The state owned printing companies themselves denied the rumours in official letters. In another twist, Echorouk is filing a lawsuit against ElWatan in a fight that might bring down one of the two newspapers (most likely ElWatan) for a few months. The newspaper’s response is hilarious and is full of appeals to popularity and nationalism. They keep looking down on ElWatan’s use of French by repeatedly using the adjective “francophone” in a derogatory manner. I wonder what they’d think of this blog.

Recall that Echorouk shot to national success by sensualising the recent Algeria-Egypt football rivalry. Its editorial line has been very populist since three years ago. It claims to be printing over 1 million copies a day (1.5 million during the matches days), a phenomenal figure by national, regional and Arab standards. The production price of a copy is higher than its selling price, so the newspaper supposedly relies on advertising to turn a profit. Well, it appears that the newspaper might have been amassing debts all the way through the football saga.

El Mouhtarem draws a lot of legitimacy from the claim that he is in the journalism profession working for a state newspaper. By night he diffuses what he hears throughout the day on his collective blog. His posts include all kinds of mysterious insights into Algerian politics and press. His blog has been gaining popularity and might sadly be one of the first victims of a proposed internet filtering system.

Beyond the claim of business mismanagement, there is an implicit questioning of Echorouk’s editorial line. Echorouk has been largely aligned with the government. However, its act of publishing Djamila Bouhired’s letter is speculated to have turned some enemies within the state. The state uses the newspapers’ debts to the state owned printing companies as a potential stick, so a claim that Echorouk owes that much money makes it under a particularly large stick that may come down onto it real soon, forcing it to tread a more pro government stance. A few years ago the newspaper Le Matin was harassed and forced to close using debts in this way.

The end of this storm will be fun to watch. It is quite humorous how such a large newspaper comes down on the defensive by the mighty stroke of an individual blogger!

In practice both chambers are tightly controlled by men who are loyal to the President. The upper chamber routinely rubber stamps any laws the lower chamber passes. Its president, Abdelkader Bensalah, is a staunch believer in the president’s program. When he was president of the lower chamber, he has been known to try and squash any sign of oppositions laws. The presidential third is used to reward personalities of all types with little regard for expertise, intellectuality or diversity. The President is in a position to offer some seats to win support and neutralise potential opposing voices – most lately the president is rumoured to have offered Djamila Bouhired a senate seat, and he might well do that to counter the criticism that her letters have garnered. In the letters she complained that representatives are paid way and beyond any veteran or John Doe Algerian is paid.

Constitutionally, the upper chamber has 144 members, one third is directly appointed by the president, and two-thirds (2 x 48) are elected by an electoral college formed by elected officials at the provincial and mayoral levels. Each province is represented by two senators. Half of each of these two sections of the senate is renewed every three years, i.e. half of the presidential third, and one senator of each province.

The senate mirrors the results of the previous national provincial and mayoral elections. This has the effect of rendering the senatorial renewal the most dull and totally predictable of the already predictable Algerian elections. Parties have some wiggle room to form alliances and vote for each other’s candidates but that has never caused a major upset.

This year, only five parties are seriously contending for the senate in four fronts. The five parties are the historical now mercurial FLN, the (Secularist? Capitalist? Opportunist?) RND, the islamically inspired MSP, the nationalist FNA and the Trotskyist Workers’ Party (PT). Louiza Hanoune’s Workers’ Party has pledged its votes for the RND in a bizarre alliance. The presidential alliance triangle (FLN-RND-MSP) are not running together. Only the FLN and the RND stand any real chance of winning a substantial number of senate seats. The FLN stands to win a majority since it won a large proportion of the last provincial/mayoral elections. The MSP, as usual, just hopes for the president to award two or three senate seats from the presidential third for their loyal support within the presidential alliance. Four of their elected senators are up for re-election, and it remains to be seen if they’ll be able to get them back by doing behind the scene deals with either the FLN or the RND.

The FFS under the historical Hocine Ait Ahmed and the RCD are boycotting the elections, a position they took since Bouteflika’s ascent to power.  Ennahda/ElIslah, two islamic parties that were once one do not stand any chance of winning. They both suffered internal struggles because of government meddling and the inflexibility of Abdellah Djabellah, their leader at one point. Both parties have now been in effect successfully obsoleted.

The RND-PT alliance has created a handful of hotly contested seats against the FLN, notably in Skikda (historically Islamically inspired and the city of origin of Djaballah’s movement), and El-Tarf (usually FLN controlled). The absence of any substantial differences in the policies of RND’s and FLN’s senators make these electoral fights largely decorative. The RND-PT alliance is bizarre because it joins a Trotskyist party with the RND under Ahmed Ouyahya, a man who always stood for privatisation and less rights for workers and who always infuriated both the PT and the union organisations in the past.

The RND-PT alliance is yet another major set back for opposition forces. It appears that Louiza Hanoune is trying to get under the umbrella of the government should any major shakeup of the cabinet occur. One notices that the political sphere, with the major political forces all under Bouteflik’a sphere of power closely resembles the homogeneity of  Boumediene’s era, in which the FLN played the role of the one big party under which multiple currents coexisted and shared power. The immediate logical question to such a setup is the question of succession.

Consitutional reforms to combat this concentration of power are badly needed. While it is true that virtually no amount of textual laws can prevent a dull political scene, some steps can help mitigate its effects and encourage a more lively debate. A six months obligatory rotation of the presidency of the two chambers among the top represented parties will empower the small opposition. This will create a rotation of six presidencies over three years, and that will be hard to control  as it is not easy to manipulate election results to create a senate or a congress where the top six forces are pro government. The presidential third should be abolished, and the number of elected senators should be doubled to make it possible for parties that have relatively few provincial/mayoral representatives to win seats.

One would argue that after Bouteflika’s partial success at relinquishing control from the military, he should actively try to create a political scene in which power can be rotated among parties. It is only when that happens that Algeria’s claim at being a democratic state will have any legitimacy.

Very few living people in Algeria still command the same respect as Djamila Bouhired as a revolution figure. The revolution is sacred, and so are the people who participated in it – but only those who passed away during the revolution or  stayed on the touchline after the independence. After 1962, the men and women of  the revolution chose or were forced into three different paths. The first group took control of the country in a single party rule and dived in its wealth, sharing it with those who turned out to be opportunists. The second group voiced their discontent about the direction that the new state was taking, and were all forced into exile or were mysteriously assassinated. The third group chose to keep quiet, living on the sidelines, content with being remembered every year on the national day and being given a token state recognition every now and then. Djamila has been one of these until two weeks ago, when she chose to step back into the field, and what a step it was.

Djamila sent two letters to the most popular Arabic and French newspapers, Echorouk and ElWatan. The first is mainly pro-state and the second is firmly in the opposition camp. But that doesn’t matter, the goal was to reach the largest audience. The letters voices her personal hardship and her discontent with the way she has been mistreated along with war veterans. But Djamila’s aim is not to merely voice her unhappiness, it seems to be an effort to embarrass the current government in general, and the current president, Bouteflika, in particular. The letters were addressed in his name.

Like most veterans, Djamila is drawn a remuneration that is modest to good by Algerian standards. Djamila was given an apartment in ElMouradia, one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in the country and the site for the Presidential palace itself. She has been assigned a maid to help her in the apartment. The remuneration money would not be able to cover for the typical private health costs of her age, so her claim is legitimate. Djamila could have contacted one of the many veterans organisations in the country, and they would have scrambled to help her. But the Ministry of Mudjahideen (veterans) and the Organisation of Martyrs both claimed that Djamila never contacted them directly about her hardship.

Djamila must know the status that she holds with Algerians and Arabs all over the world. She was depicted in both La Battaile D’Alger and the Egyptian blockbuster “Djamila”, both films that thrilled the international and Arab audiences respectively. She has always been a symbol of feminine activity in largely men dominated Arab societies. Her letters caused an outcry in Algerian circles to the huge embarrassment of the state. The Arab press roamed free to criticise the Algerian government’s carelessness, with much of the criticism coming from Egyptian circles (ongoing football row). The blow was with such force that the government could not even issue a statement or apologise, instead there are reports of efforts to appease her with better Villas and a potential position in the cabinet or one of the veteran organisations.

Her move signals that she is foremost deeply unhappy with Bouteflika, who, just a few months ago, held her hands as he paraded her to an audience of foreign personalities and diplomats during the yearly independence celebrations. The feud could be personal: Bouteflika enjoyed the legacy of the revolution to the fullest: he became foreign minister at the age of 27, having served for only the last few years of the revolution. His return was orchestrated using his revolution and Boumediènian credits, and he used that to concentrate power more than ever before into the presidency and seek a third presidential term.

It would not be a surprise if Djamila’s move was encouraged by a circle of veterans, many of whom may still be powerful figures in the Algerian army. It has for long been known that there is a great power struggle between Bouteflika and some Army sections that are unhappy with the way he has been stripping them from power. The struggle manifested itself more openly in Benflis’s attempt at unseating Bouteflika in the presidential elections of 2004 and the ensuing internal struggle within the FLN. Djamila’s letters may not necessarily suggest an evil motive as she may simply be unhappy with the way Bouteflika and his henchmen have been benefiting from the country’s wealth while ignoring the plight of countless veterans.

Djamila’s cry sheds further light on the colossal mismanagement of the veterans issue. Veterans of the revolution enjoy quite a range of benefits that are a point of envy, greed and controversy for Algerians. In addition to the remuneration, veterans can import certain goods without tax and often get priority when houses and apartments are allocated by the state. In many eyes, the veteran system has  become a vehicle of corruption where opportunists and corrupt officials use dubious revolution credits to maximise their wealth. Algeria is often quipped to be the only country whose number of veterans increases over time. In 2006 there was a great debacle at the claim that up to 50000 registered veterans are not only false veterans, but were actively fighting against the revolution.

The veteran system has become to be seen as a vehicle with which power hungry officials claim credence. It represents the failed legacy of the revolution in many Algerians’ eyes. The revolution captivated the people’s minds and set the Algerians hopes high with visions of freedom and development. But now the agony of the disappointment over its legacy can be seen in many  writings and events , such as Ahlam Mosteghanmi’s trilogy, the illegal immigration problem (Harga) and now Djamila’s letters. Djamila’s complaint is, in the end, a continuation of this collective mourning.

Evident is the fact that Israel and its lobbies in European countries have for long known that a proper court is no venue for propaganda. The standard arsenal of deceit and bold lies cannot navigate the rough landscape of evidence, reason and the law. One would think that a reasonable legal system would hold every defendant to the same law and the same treatment. One would believe that accused defendants clear themselves in court. Not in Europe.

Netanyahu charges: “We will not accept a situation in which [former Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert, [Defence Minister] Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni will be summoned to the defendants’ chair”, publicly declaring that any Israeli politician is beyond the law, beyond questioning for any war crimes or crimes against humanity. Such a nefarious statement comes from the same man who continues, just as arrogantly and shamelessly, to license building settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, to order routine raids on the Palestinian territories and to effectively give the peace process the death sentence at a time when an American administration just might be looking for a real end to the conflict.

Europe and America cannot expect Israel to work for peace while pretending that she is beyond the law. Europe and Obama are being humiliated by Netanyahu who refuses to react positively to their calls for a solution, appearing powerless without anything to bargain for. But now British politicians would rather castrate any power that could hold sway over Israel, even the law itself. Israel will again give them the same treatment that can be expected from a nation that doesn’t stand to lose anything by doing as she wishes, from building more settlements to murdering thousands of civilians and anything in between.

Israel sympathisers speak of Palestinians and people working for their cause “hijacking the courts” for their own gains. What they really mean is that the Palestinians do not deserve justice and that the courts should by default not uphold them as equal humans. The self-evident fact that the law is the text and the text is nonnegotiable for anyone is suddenly forgotten. Benedict Brogan in the Indepedant does one step better and singles out all muslims who sought justice in British courts as unworthy of it. “Britain’s judicial system is being used to help the bad guys”  he thinks. To him, any muslim victim is a bad guy by nature. Nothing will appease these guys apart from codifying into law the exclusion of Muslims from any right to justice. Anyone seeking justice for these “bad guys” is a terrorist sympathiser or an anti-Semite, words that for all intents have long been emptied of any meaning.

With the principle of Universal Jurisdiction now dead, buried and forgotten next to the tomb of the separation of powers the war criminals of Israel and the world, with blood still fresh on their hands, can rejoice and party with the forgotten rights of those they oppress and the glory of the friendship and approval of western powers.

Here is the text of the comment in full, as posted in the previous entry:

I just ran across this discussion on your blog.

There are some media reports of a deal between Algeria and the U.S. for temporary use of bases in Algeria. These reports aren’t accurate.

For more info, I invite you to read AFRICOM commander General William Ward’s news conference transcript from December 3 in Algiers, posted on the http://www.africom.mil website: http://bit.ly/5ouvZX

Quotes include:

“I did not come here with any request to put troops in the Sahel to combat terrorism and I have no plans to do so.”

“[T]here are no plans to conduct that type of training or exercises here in Algeria.”

The United States is not conducting any combat operations in the Sahel, to include Algeria or any of its neighboring countries.

Respectfully,

Vince Crawley
U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs
http://www.africom.mil

So far the reasons given by Zitout and the Quds Press story do not stand up to scrutiny (see reasoning in previous post). It is unclear whether Zitout’s claim is pure speculation or inside knowledge.  What is mysterious is not only whether a base has been agreed or not, it is also what the current Algerian authorities will gain from the deal. Recall that ABC news broadcasted a report about American forces training Algerian special forces in the Sahara earlier this year (video). Whether this limited American military presence extended beyond, or will extend beyond what is present in the report  is unclear.

The government cooked together a law throughout the last year to combat cybercrime, terrorism websites and internet pornography. cybercrime has been an evident  problem of late. The lack of successful role models and a market where IT specialists could fuel their energy encouraged the youth to view hacking as a desirable, heroic, patriotic or even religious activity. The recent Algeria Egypt football match saw some literally fierce website hacking battles, facilitated by the laughable security in government IT systems in both countries. On the other hand, indecency laws have been used rigorously to put people who distribute obscene pictures to trial. Some cases were featured at large as the subjects (mostly women) were threatened and sentences ended up being harsh, enrolling charges of extortion.

So the law resonates very well with a local population that is increasingly conservative and hostile to a pornographic industry seen as a product of  broken Western morals, while at the same time very frustrated at the sporadic yet continuous terrorist attacks. The government was largely successful in introducing the laws without much resistance or proper discussion from the local press, non governmental organisations or Internet café owners (Internet cafés are main venues for connectivity).

Now the government is turning towards implementing a publicly funded national filtering system to filter and monitor web usage. I could stomach that a large portion of the population might find such a system desirable. I could also accept that it gets enabled it by default for new customers. What I just can’t pass up are the plans to make circumvention of such filters illegal and punishable. Such a system would be too easy to abuse to crack down on dissident voices and cause the abortion of the infantile Algerian blogosphere.

Given the Algerian authorities’ track record against the printed press, I am not at all delighted with this move. The authorities have repeatedly used its monopoly of the printing and advertising businesses in the country to reign in on independent newspapers. The same treatment will surely be unveiled on undesirable websites with the click of a button.

Aggravating the threat is the judicial system’s extreme technophobia, as in literal hostility towards technology. The judges often give the impression that they do not understand technology and lay down sentences on the whim of suspicion, sometimes in an effort to inflate the number of “caught” terrorists and terrorist “sympathisers” or to exaggerate the severity of web terrorist activity inside the country. This blogger knows several people who have been locked up because their computer equipment contained pictures of terrorist attacks that were saved from local press websites, and were publicly available in printed form in the hundreds of thousands.

Circumventing the filtering system in and of itself should not be banned and there should be no legal repercussions whatsoever for doing so. It is up to the prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as dictated by the law has been comitted with no remorse to the filtering system. In this age of the 21st century and its technologies, it is trivial for a moderately savvy user to circumvent almost any filtering mechanism.

The country should instead concentrate on improving internet facilities for its citizens and should implement policies that encourage the use of the Web to diffuse information and empower civil discourse. The fact that the country has no filtering system yet is, sadly, not a reflection of liberal tendencies or love for freedom of speech. It is a reflection of the fact of that Internet penetration is very low even by the region’s standards. A just released market research report forecasts it to grow to 3.2% by 2013 – a deplorable figure. The cause is not lack of resources or of IT brainpower, it is pure business mismanagement. The network is managed by the state owned bureaucratic Algérie Télécom, a monolithic archaic entity that, despite having more than 3 million lines, was valued by potential investors at the paltry sum of $200 million for the whole internet/fixed telephony business last year. An embarrassingly low figure for a usually investor safe lone communication market player. In contrast, the mobile market is estimated to be worth a figure in the double digits of billions of dollars. On the incompetence of Internet providers, I recount my experience: I lodged an application for a DSL line and paid 6 months of subscription upfront only to be figuratively tortured with endless promises and delays, not to speak of regular downtime and aweful peak time speeds once service started. Issam Hamoud, an Algerian blogger in the capital no less recalls a similar experience.

My only condolence were such a system implemented and abused is the possibility that it will backfire, knowing the netizens’ tendency to quickly reassemble and follow what they’ve been banned with vengeance. The low penetration numbers can suggest more malice than failure, as the authorities may not want to get bothered with a problem of internet political activity in the first place.

In particular, the events that happened directly at the ending of the revolution during the course of the year 1962 remain a mystery, with conflicting accounts from various historians inside and outside the country. So much happened too quickly to untangle: French Army factions breaking away, FLN internal strife, false fighters, Harkis, Pieds Noirs run anti-independence resistance movements, opportunists trying to get the best booties and the list goes on. It all ended in a blood bath where so many were killed in sometimes shameful ways, unfolding one of the dark chapters of the revolution.

Mobs would go through urban areas and extra judiciously kill anyone who was suspected of being complicit with the French side against the FLN. Sometimes false fighters would aid in these operations to get some credit and snap a couple of photos to gain Mujahid status. The benefits of the status were substantial in the newly created socialist state:  a life long renumeration, free transportation, medical care, priority when importing goods (e.g a car or a fridge…). Some of these people would go on and hold high offices in the state, only for their back-story to be revealed decades later, much to the confusion and astonishment of the Algerian people. Accusations and false reports still spread to this day. It is all still a mess to be sorted.

Many suspected Algerian Muslims, Jews and Christians were targeted during the mob killings. Some Jews and Christians continued to live in the infant state even though the majority left. I do not believe that the FLN and the revolution had an inherently racist or xenophobic agenda.  While digging through history books, specifically Mohamed Harbi’s “La Guerre d’Algérie”, published in 2004, I came through a letter from the FLN written to the Jewish community in 1962. The FLN tried to engage the Jewish community and appealed to them to side with the Algerian revolution. The FLN was sympathetic to the plight that the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis and Vichy’s government. It aknowledges the help of many Jews that were in the cause of the revolution.

Harbi was a high officer within the FLN, served in the first government after the independence and later fled after Boumediène’s coup of 1965. The letter led me to find another written in 1956, two years after the start of the revolutions. Excerpts of the letters appear below.

From the translation of the first letter (1956) (all emphasis is mine):

The National Liberation Front, which has led the anti-colonialist revolution for the past two years, feels that the moment has arrived when every Algerian of Israelite origin, in light of his own experience, must without any ambiguity choose sides in this great historic battle. The FLN, authentic and exclusive representative of the Algerian people, considers it its obligation to directly address the Israelite community and to ask it to solemnly affirm its membership in the Algerian nation. This choice clearly affirmed, it will dissipate all misunderstandings and extirpate the seeds of hatred maintained by French colonialism. It will also contribute to recreating Algerian fraternity, broken by the arrival of French colonialism.[...]

Without going too far back in history, it seems useful to us to recall the time when the Jews, held in less consideration than animals, didn’t even have the right to inter their dead, the latter being secretly buried during the night wherever this could be done, due to the absolute prohibition against the Jews having any cemeteries. At precisely this period Algeria was the refuge and land of freedom for the Israelites who fled the inhuman persecutions of the Inquisition. Precisely during this period the Israelite community was proud to offer its Algerian fatherland not only poets, but consuls and ministers.

It is because the FLN considers the Algerian Israelites the sons of our Fatherland that it hopes that the leaders of the Jewish community will have the wisdom to contribute to the building of a free and truly fraternal Algeria…

And from the second letter (1962):

The Algerian problem is at a decisive stage. We want to address this appeal to you, in the face of the hysterical and racist clamor of the fascists who claim to speak in your name, declaring that you are French and that you are all participants in the criminal acts of the backwards colonialists. You know full well that this is both a gratuitous declaration and a policy of mystification that should fool know [sic] one, and even less so you, who are Algerians.[...]

…Recently, in Oran, demonstrations provoked by young hotheads in the Israelite neighborhood took place, followed by fires set in stores belonging to Muslims. These acts are the clearest illustration of how some of you attempt to thoughtlessly align yourselves with the racial policies of the ultras. Will you today make yourselves the accomplices of the backwards colonialists by rising up against your Algerian brothers of Muslim origin?…[...]

Israelite compatriots, many Israelites are active in our ranks. Some among them were interned, others are still in prison for their acts in service to the Algerian cause. Algeria’s independence is near; independent Algeria will need you and tomorrow you will need it, for it is your country. Your Muslim brothers honestly and loyally offer you their hand for solidarity coming from your direction. It is your duty to answer.

These  letters are not new, I am not trying to break new ground or rewrite history. They were just found by a curious mind digging back through the history of his country. These letters do not excuse the treatment that Jews or anyone endured after the revolution, what they show is that the Jews were not targeted because of their religion, they just shared the fate that anyone that was suspected of complicity and treason with the French did.

[* For the record, I don't believe Algerians are unique in this. Some French still believe that colonialism is great,  the British believe they delivered prosperity everywhere throughout their empire, and some Americans think they ought to deliver democracy or freedom or something wherever there is oil. Nationalism is sweet like that.]

Mourad Medelci, Algeria's foreign minister

Since Algeria’s foreign minister’s recent visit to the United States speculation is intense about its intentions and results. From the Western Saharan issue and its recent developments to possible armament deals and good ol’ business. Both Mr Medelci and Mrs Clinton remained vague about what they discussed in their micro press conference, half the questions by journalists were answered with the usual diplomatic filler tripe, and the other half was irrelevant to the visit, indicating the media’s usual apathy to the country.

But today Quds Press dropped a bomb and reported that the country has succumbed to the United States’ pressure to have a military base in the country. The formula seems to be holding “temporary” bases where American troops launch fast attacks against AQIM throughout the Sahara, trailing them to their holdouts in neighbouring countries. Supposedly the temporary nature of the bases avoids upsetting the local population. The story is gaining momentum, with Aljazeera throwing their mammoth weight behind it and soon the local opposition press will follow suit.

Mohamed Larbi Zitout

Such a heavy claim commands careful analysis though. First, the only source of this is Mohamed Larbi Zitout, a disgruntled former Algerian diplomat now in Asylum in Britain. Zitout is a fierce critic of the Algerian government, appearing on multiple news channels Arab and Western. But before going deeper into his background and to avoid any accusations of ad homming the source, we will dig elsewhere first.

Bouteflika’s Algeria has tried to play the cards with everyone and keep passable diplomatic ties with world powers. The country exports a considerable amount of oil to the United States, with Halliburton and other American companies present in the industry. Culturally it is closely tied to France (it pretends this is not true). The country’s recent multi billion construction projects are mainly managed by Chinese and Japanese companies, whose relationships with Algeria are apolitical so far. Most substantially, Algeria imports most of its important Arms from Russia, including advanced aircraft equipment and surface to air missiles. This is why the country is strategically considered in the Russian camp.

A decision to accept American bases would severally upset this balance of powers. The country has tried to keep this balance for as long as possible, never opening up to one direction, habitually pissing everyone off in turn. The Russions in the last scandalous armament deal, when the Algerian military was publicly dissatisfied with the quality of the MiGs they received. France by demanding apologies for the war of independence every few years and refusing to fully endorse Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union. And lastly, the United States by publicly refusing to hold an American military base when debate about American involvement in the Maghreb intensified following the rise of AQIM.

Paradoxically, AQIM is much less of a threat now than it was perceived to be in 2005/2006. AlQuaeda In the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has largely failed in implementing its Agenda of exporting its ideology throughout the region, as confirmed by the findings of Jean-Pierre Filiu, the expert on terrorist movements in the region, in a Carnegie Endowment report.  AQIM’s predecessors, the various terrorist groups that were fighting the Algerian state, had some support within the population after the coup of 1991. Despite the horrific events of the late 90′s against civilians, this support diminished year by year but never completely went away  because of continual frustration at the state. That support seems to have nearly completely dried up inside the country and its neighbours, as AQIM’s global vision and integration of fighters from foreign American wars made Algerians realise that AQIM are not fighting for their cause and that their Agenda is foreign. American bases in the country will give more fuel to AQIM and possibly even reverse its fortunes. AQIM is weaker and is perceived to be weaker by the population, so their presence and current state cannot alone explain Algeria’s possible sudden change of heart.

The country has forever publicly stated that they allow no foreign bases on Algerian soil full stop. The nation draws great pride from its war of Independence and is extremely sensitive to the idea of foreign troops. For a long time it has been a source of differentiation from other Middle Eastern countries, notably the Gulf countries: they have American bases and troops, we don’t, they succumb to foreign powers, we don’t! It also helps that the country has been geographically far from any hot spot. That is, until AQIM’s rise and Algeria’s public refusal to host bases.

Quds Press, Aljazeera and Zitout speculate that the Algerian élite and military officials have a lot to gain from setting up private security companies that help an American military presence – Black Water gained billions in Iraq and other places. A powerful argument for sure, but the lack of history of sacrificing diplomatic standing over financial gains, even personal ones undermines it. The country has forever let its generals and army commanders run loose in holding the main companies that import essential goods and dealing with far more money than anything that these security companies might bring. Moreover, au contraire, Algeria’s habit has been the opposite: easily letting away financial opportunities using dubious spiteful laws (Oil windfall taxes as an example) and more prudent diplomatic stances.

The second argument is that Algeria is seeking the US’s support on Western Sahara. This issue, while important to the Algerian authorities, has never garnered enough importance to make the country take such drastic measures, and indeed, Algeria has been successful in shaping the terms of the conflict. This argument is even weaker in the light of Morocco’s recent difficulties vs Aminatou and Spain. The third argument is Algeria’s desire for American arms, a drastic change in its stance with its old ally Russia if true. Lastly, Zitout says that the country wants its general to be protected when travelling abroad, since many of them could be accused of war crimes after Bouteflika’s reconciliation laws that largely exonerated them. Usually the preferred destination for these generals is Europe, somewhere on the shores of lake Geneva or the Cote d’Azur, and American protection will not prevent NGO’s and European countries launching criminal cases against them.

Algeria’s response to this will be closely watched in local and Arab circles. The traditional response of the government in situation like these is dead silence – the presidency and authorities often given the impression that they are beyond answering rumours and speculation. That is, until the rumour grows big enough, and there is no question that this will only grow.  Aljazeera is a powerful force in the Algerian public opinion arena. The station carried the story  both on its Arabic based website and on air, the local press will soon follow.

So the verdict is that the story has little truth, given what we know now. It appears that Zitout wants to corner Algeria in a difficult situation by forcing them to, once again, publicly state that they don’t accept foreign bases, humiliating both Algeria and the US after the diplomatic visit and potentially doing enough damage to reverse any diplomatic progress. Zitout’s public goal through the Rachad movement that he co-founded is to weaken and topple the current government via peaceful means (and from exile), and this could be one of the tools he is using.

Indeed, attaining the trust and initiative on human rights proves to be a difficult task for many countries with a dark human rights record. These countries can be divided into three main groups: group one could not care less about the issue; it includes regimes such as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and the current Burmese government. Group two gives some lip service but do very little to champion the rights in practice. Russia and some of the Middle East countries are examples. Group three are countries that have made  significant advances in securing the rights for their citizens, and this includes countries in Eastern Europe and the Asian tigers.

Short of a complete political overhaul, such as possibly a bloody revolution, countries in group one seldom change their stance. Countries in group three will continue their progress: advancing human rights causes a positive feedback loop (except some, ahem, notable exceptions). Very few countries make it from group two to group three successfully and irreversibly.

Algeria has been painfully wobbling in group two for a few years. Sometimes coming close to making the leap, other times doing enough damage to go back to the frontiers of group one. What’s undoubted is  that the Algerian authorities do give the impression that they passionately believe in the values and try some baby steps. Bouteflika, in the previous speech, also boldly envisioned the country as playing a “major role in championing human rights in the African and Arab dimensions”. The government sponsors a “National Human Rights Commission”. State newspapers, such as Elmoudjahid, from which these quotes are taken, routinely praise the government’s human rights “advances”. Government participating parties such as the Islamic MSP hold rallies on the issue. The country’s head of police says that the police are barred from even lifting their hands or shouting at a citizen. There has been a number of judicial reforms aimed at improving sentence waiting times.

That was talk, and probably a limping walk, but the real walk is yet to come. Independent newspapers are scared into submission using some phony anti libel laws and the state’s near complete control of the printing and advertising companies.  The resources that the Army has provide easy money for generals to launch vindictive lawsuits against authors and journalists. Demonstrations are banned in the capital and practically in most of the country since the events of Black Spring. Many photographers and authors have been rounded up – a recent tourist photographer recounted his encounter with an Algerian policeman. In criminal cases, prison waiting times can be absurdly high, sometimes running into the years, especially in cases that deal with terrorism charges.

If you read the above paragraph without the surrounding context, you would realise that the scenes that it describes can be found in any country of group two. The problems seem to be shared – it’s the same tape everywhere. So what is the problem, and  how can the state make the leap?

Algeria inherited a nasty double legacy of two periods that did much damage to the country’s human rights stance. The totalitarian socialist state of the 60s-80s introduced a one party rule, state land tenure, dubious assassinations and a powerful intelligence gathering force, althought it had many economic and diplomatic successes. The period of the civil war of the 90s did the most damage. Assassinations against policemen, judges, politicians and other civil servants pitted the government against the whole population in its eyes. Torture ran ripe to get as much intelligence as possible from first hand, second and even long distance contacts of suspected terrorists. Many believe that certain factions of the army orchestrated a number of massacres to paint the opposition fighters in a worse light. The government in the 90s was effectively under an international embargo and was extremely paranoid of outside pressure. It painfully made it through the late 90s and into the reconciliation plan of the current President. For some time, it seemed that the country is making some breakthroughs.

Yet the country seems to be reversing its progress. The parliament speed passed a law that allowed the president to run for life. We thought we were lucky that the president has no children. Yet now it is widely believed that the president’s brother is being groomed for the job. Demonstrations continue to be outlawed. The right to assembly is severely limited.  Newspapers continue to be sued and scared. In short, the country’s independent human rights organisation paint a very bleak picture today.

In the absence of a full understanding of human rights and its benefits to the country’s economic and political well being, countries like Algeria will continue to wobble. The country needs to understand that free speech makes better citizens, more vibrant economies, world-class universities – all goals declared by the state. All citizens must be equal behind the law, nobody should be beyond reproach. How is a president or a minister  harmed if a journalist paints a caricature of them or an author criticises them? their legal venue should be the venue of public opinion, not that of the courts or the prison cells. Free assembly makes better informed and motivated citizens. Let them march on the capital and demand what they want. In the end, the equilibrium that will be formed will ensure long lasting growth and development, instead of the limping wreck of an economy that exists today.

Lose your grip on the people, and let them fix the country themselves, for a government’s goal is to enable its citizens to develop and move the country forward, not to draw up ever failing bureaucratic plans from the ivory towers of ElMouradia and the various ministries in the capital.

The first piece is written by Fayssal Alqassem, one of the most popular journalists in the Arab world. His syndicated column is printed in almost every Arab country. He is one of the BBC trained journalists who helped shape Aljazeera’s image with taboo destroying programmes. In his piece, titled “The Myth of Indiviual Liberty in the West” he is as usual, abrasive and confrontational. He amusingly subtitles his column “Careful, a camera is watching you”.  He contrasts Arab countries’ anti-Human Rights record, describing it as rather dumb and too obvious -  with the West’s, which is according to him cleverer, by using technology such as DNA databases and cameras in public places. The latest minaret ban is just the west accidently getting into the dumb anti human rights ways. Some selected quotes (paraphrasing):

I don’t want to suggest that the Arab countries’ have a crisp human rights record – far from it. But the Arab intelligence and security institutes are still behind in terms of technology and logistics of spying, monitoring and citizen surveillance , at least the Arab can try and evade his country’s incompetence. But in the “west”, who is often riding the moral high horse on human rights, citizens are under surveillance 24 hours a day. The big brother that George Orwell warned us from is watching everywhere. Rarely can you walk through a street in Europe without noticing dozens of cameras watching even the ants. In London alone there are more than 4 million cameras…

And then some attacks on the United States:

Uncle Sam does not only want to monitor his citizens alone, he wants to monitor the whole world. We need not cite the spying network and its surveillance operations around the world [...] I also want to congratulate Europe on their new European law that makes it possible to allow the CIA to get access to , lawfully, the banking details of  its citizens.

I don’t know what law he is referring to, that is scary if true. Fayssal’s punch line is rich:

Oh George Orwell, if you still lived you’d wish the old soviet style surveillance tactics are still in force instead!

The second piece is written by Fawzi Oussedek, a local Algerian journalist. He titled it “Human rights in Switzerland, melting like chocolate in Minarets [sic]“. He contrasts the perceived reaction of the West, governments, institutes and individuals alike towards the Minaret ban with their reactions to any similar measure in the Arab and Muslim Worlds. There are a lot more Muslims in the West than say, Christians in Muslim countries so the difference in reactions seems even more absurd to him. On Western reactions he says:

Since the Minaret ban I have been waiting the views of human rights organisations [...] that made a habit of criticising some places for their human rights record [...] since the ban I have been listening to commentators in the west trying to justify the unjustifiable [...] Governmental reactions amounted to only expressing mere dismay, a tactic that they used to diplomatically evade their moral stance on human rights.

Then he contrasts this reaction to reactions towards the Muslim world:

I wonder, what if such a vote was made in a Muslim country to ban some other religious symbol, what would be the reaction? simply, we will hear many descriptions about the whole muslim world, from backwardness to being hateful, the reaction can amount to using economic pressure sometimes, and to scare the countries in question by threatening to include them in the “black list”!! [...] but in Switzerland some considered democratic referendums as saintly, it’s just sometimes possible to use them unwisely – evading the moral stance towards the ban.

The author then suggests that the muslim community try and fight this ban all the way in Swiss and European courts.

The ban and other similar measures around Europe, such as the previous veil ban in France , France and Netherlands’ flirtations with banning certain types of clothing and Britain’s “English Defence League“  will provide more fuel for criticism, and will sadly have ramifications on democratic reform in the whole Arab world.

Morroco’s main strategy is to advance the idea that the conflict is a made up one – and that Algeria is the real adversary. The view is partly correct: Algeria does fund and give political and territorial support for Polisario, and the western Sahara issue is the only issue they spend money on lobbying (soft term for bribing) in Washington.  Aminatou Haidar’s hunger strike, as embarrassing as it is for Morroco and as perturbing as it is for Spain, is a convenient perfect argument for Algeria to counter the strategy of Al Maghzen – they need not say a word and the saga will continue to be a public relations nightmare for both countries and a point for Algeria, as it moves the focus of the conflict from the Morrocan-Algerian Axis to the Moroccan-Polisario axis, or even more conveniently, to the Moroccan-Spanish Axis. The more adversaries in the conflict the better – while they are at it,  bring in human rights organisations if possible.

Algeria’s main strategy towards the conflict was to try and delegate the problem to the Polisario when possible, and to just act behind the scenes. Algeria’s success at prolonging and aggravating the problem is rather remarkable – even more remarkable is its success in helping to shape the terms of the conflict and its image in the world as she wishes – all the while appearing to care much less about the issue than Morocco.  In terms of public relations, both internationally and domestically,  Algeria’s strategy is two-fold depending on the audience.

Internationally, since the days when it had an active role in third world politics and the non alignment movement (When the current president Bouteflika was the secretary of foreign affairs – great video, the guy always had a sharp tongue) Algeria’s main argument overseas is to insist that it is championing the self-determination rights of the Western Saharan people. Having declared independence in 1962 after such a vote, the argument was  strong, and is still rather powerful despite the rise of federalism and the tendency of independence voices in various parts around the world to be quieted down through a form of a republic federalist compromise or by completely refusing to succumb: Iraq’s Kurds, Northern Ireland, the failure of the PLO so far to create a state and Eta in Spain are examples (the Balkan region is an exception to this  because of its rather different history, and Scotland is also in a separate group – I don’t think the efforts of the SNP for independence from the union will be successful after all).

A refugee camp for Sahrawis in Tindouf - The Polisario is housed in Tindouf

Despite its horrific human rights record, especially in the “black decade” of the 90s, Algeria also often uses this conflict to bolster an image of a human rights campaigner for the rights of the Western Saharan people – the Algerian authorities have for long maintained that they support democracy in the region, supposedly being a democracy (at least on paper) as opposed to the monarchy in Morocco.  This image of a democracy championing state was rather conveniently supported by Bush’s New Middle East doctrine: then, the Algerian authorities declared that they are unconcerned by the initiative because, hey, we are a democracy and see, we also want democracy elsewhere. Their tactic here and Bush’s initiative conveniently blend well. Domestically, the Algerian authorities used this argument for all it’s worth.

Turning to its domestic strategy, as is the case for most foreign conflicts, the Western conflict is a convenient rallying point for the authorities (this strategy is shared with Morocco as well). This is a standard procedure with most states – keep the population busy overseas and try to use nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings towards the issue. Algeria has been very successful domestically at rallying the whole nation, be it media, newspapers, parties of the whole spectrum behind the authorities. There is almost totally no dissident voice moving even an iota towards the Morrocan stance. Any hint of such a stance is squarely quashed. A few years ago , “Rida Talyani”  (literally, Rida the italian), a pop singer, wore the Moroccan flag and expressed his support for a Moroccan Western Sahara in a concert in Morocco – his music plunged from top of the charts to absolute obscurity very quickly as he was banned (unofficially)  from participating in concerts and from any TV or Radio programme.

The historical 5 Algerian figures detained by France after the hijacking, 1956, allegedly with Moroccan help

The issue is a handy agreement point between the government, the newspapers and the opposition. Almost all the newspapers, persecuted or not,  state run or private, in Arabic or in French rally staunchly behind the government on this issue. Likewise, opposition parties, left or Kabyle region based, as well as Islamist parties such as the MSP follow the government line. The Moroccan monarchy provides very little incentive to rationalise an ulterior opinion. Any potential remorse to Pan-Arabism, Islamic Solidarity or Maghreb El-Kebir politics can usually be squarely addressed by the claim that Monarchy has sold out and that the Moroccan compass has always been turned towards the West since Hassan II, who has a draconian evil reputation attached to him because of his alleged role in the airplane hijacking of the five Algerian revolution figures in 1956,  his supposed collaboration with Israel, allegations by the famous Egyptian journalist Heikel of spying for the West during Arab summit meetings and the list goes on.

Behind the arguments, Algeria’s stance without a doubt is not about the plight of the Saharan people. Algeria’s authorities are still, indeed, very much paranoid about the Moroccan claim to Algerian territories, a claim that Morocco has not withdrawn since it was made in the fifties. The hawks in the army will do their best to weaken the Moroccan side – better have the conflict and Moroccan land claims over there than anywhere on Algerian soil. In her view, Algeria has been bitten twice before, and the Sand War of 1963 is viewed in a bad light as Morocco tried to take Algerian western territories by force directly after the independence, supposedly taking the opportunity of the weakness of the infant Algerian state.

That war, ironically, helped stabilise the country at a time when tensions were very high among army leaders and civil wars were close to being declared over who rules the country. It would seem that the Algerian élite realised the potential of the conflict as way to score political points since then, and they seem to have been successful so far. A potential route to the Atlantic Ocean is an attractive notion as well.

Unfortunately Algerian fears make the conflict very much a military one between Algeria and Morocco. There is an ongoing fierce armament battle between the two countries (or rather, spending battles), with both countries buying military aircraft and equipment to the tune of several billion dollars. Most of the Algerian Military’s arsenal is based in the west of the country facing Morocco: in Sidi Belabes, Tindouf, Oran, Mers el-Kebir, etc.

In the absence of substantial political reform in the region, and especially in both countries, the conflict will continue to be prolonged over what is described by many as a lifeless patch of sand. A final solution has to include both countries as well as the Polisario and Mauritania, and has to leave no questions asked over the sovereignty of each state.

H1N1 infections(red) and deaths (black) as of December 7th 2009

UPDATE: Just prior to publishing this post the Ministry of Health published a new communiqué, it puts the number of confirmed deaths at 10,  one in Setif and one in Oran  (both large urban centres) , with 3 more to investigate. There are no announcements on the number of infections.

This blog continues to cover the recent rise in Swine flu in Algeria with great concern. In the last post, infections and deaths were mapped (there were 362/8 then, there are anywhere between 400 and 600 infections and 12 confirmed deaths as of today), with a great number of casualties happening in relatively remote areas. More panic is gripping the streets because of doubts about the readiness of the health infrastructure. Frustration is rising about the lack of communication from the Ministry of Health. There is little effort to educate the public about the flu. The effects of the flu panic are spilling into other sectors such as education and transport.

The Algerian public is notoriously panicky in the face of natural threats such as this. Recall that during previous solar eclipses there was so much media hype and warnings from the authorities that people feared to even go out to the streets on the day. As is the case of H1N1, the problem stems from the panic of the authorities, a lack of understanding, very weak communication channels for popular science and a weak leadership of the scientific community.

Official communication is reduced to a few declarations by the Minister of Health here and there with not much details. This is unacceptable in the face of so much panic and news from the popular newspapers. Two days ago the Minister of Health Mr Said Barkat announced from Annaba the death of 3 more people in the previous 24 hours. He wouldn’t elaborate on the locations of the deaths or the number of infections throughout the country. The last communiqué from the Ministry of Health via their website is dated the 3rd of December. There are no official numbers broken down by region in the country, which is why this blog will still try to track them via independent news sources.

There are reports of people as far as Biskra, Djelfa, Batna and the great Sahara driving over 600 miles to the capital because they don’t trust the local hospitals. Naturally the hospitals of Algiers became overcrowded, tempers flared and their administrations had to resort to permanent police presence to continue operating. Trust in the authorities is very low and that fuels even more panic – some took the chance to capitalise on selling dubious medicines.

A victim sector of this outbreak is education. Already many schools are being closed in the bourgeois region of Haidra and in the remote province of MSila which has suffered a relatively high rate of infections. After the recent teacher strikes, the outbreak couldn’t have come at a worst time with schools widely expected to close again for a few days – perhaps this will offer the best excuse to actually confirm the winter holidays which were in doubt because of the time lost during the strikes.

In other sectors, some court proceedings were adjourned, universities are unsure of how to deal with the flu, and panic did not spare even mosques, where Imams were instructed by the authorities to “educate the public about the illness”, according to Elkhabar. The newspaper reports that less people are going to the mosques as well (The tendency of the authorities to use this space is well known – previously the imams were instructed to lecture on the need “to vote for your country” to face the low voter turnouts).

The Ministry of Health reported buying 20 million flu vaccine shots, with the first batch of 900000 arriving yesterday. However, Elkhabar reported yesterday that the 900000 shots will not be available for weeks to come. There are serious doubts about the logistics involved to transport the vaccines across the vast country. The authorities should stop treating the vaccine as a silver bullet and should try to educate the public and communicate to them as much information as possible.

Well worth the read: I’m sure it resonates with the story of countless Algerians inside and outside the country. Here is the translation in English:

Run, but where to?

His name is Hassan Harrab, he has an average height, solid calves and works as a plumber. With no political convictions, he quit his country  in 1992 after some terrorist groups threatened his village to leave or  abide by Islamic Law. He went to  a small village in southern France with the intention of working for everybody as a plumber. He does not stay for long: the “Front National” took the mayoral elections in 1993, and his neighbours, clients up to then, have asked him to leave to the Arabs with his screwdrivers. Hassan Harrab takes his tool box to Marrakesh, in Morocco, where he worked in a hotel. After the terrorist attacks of 1994 there, the Algerians were forcibly deported from the country. After a journey in the back of a truck, he finds himself in Ghelizane, in Algeria, but he was considered a Moroccan. He goes to Algiers where he worked until he was thrown out of his apartment by the landlord because the landlord wanted to open a Pizzeria.

In 2000 Hassan Harrab goes to the Kabyle region, where he was persecuted because he fixed the central heating system of the local Gendarme station. After repairing some pipes in Bouira, Hassan Harrab quits Algeria again for Sfax in Tunisia, but in 2004, after a football match, some incidents occurred and Algerians were persecuted. Hassan Harrab again has to flee to Tebessa. Having gone to Egypt to work in the installation of water pumps for the Nile, he finds himself fleeing again after the recent incidents. Today in Algiers, well into his 40s, he has a particular philosophy. Where there are men, there are  losses. And welds do not typically last for long.

Given the interesting choice of the name, the story has definitely some connotations as to the people who flee the country when there are problems, how their problems may haunt them to their exile, and the incredibly hard decision of almost every Algerian in exile of whether or not to return to the country. It reminds me of the classic El-Harrachi shaabi song “Ya-Rayah”. The initials themselves “H.H.” may indicate something, but I’m not finding it – are you?

Aboul Gheit

Well, that didn’t take long. As reported by the AFP and commented about at The Arabist , the Egyptian foreign affairs minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, weighed in…  literally asking Europe not to give any more lessons on democracy, and declaring that the human rights record of the Egyptian government is good. More direct words could not have been spoken by him. The quote, given below, is just too rich!

Egypt’s top diplomat said on Thursday that a Swiss vote to ban the construction of minarets was a “grave mistake” and Europe could no longer lecture his country on human rights.

“The Swiss people will some day come to realise what a grave mistake they have made,” Ahmed Abul Gheit told Egyptian television in comments carried by the official MENA news agency.

“The human rights situation in Egypt is good… Europe cannot talk to Egypt about its human rights record at a time when Switzerland is supporting a ban on minaret building,” Abul Gheit said.

“People who live in glass houses should not throw stones,” the minister said in the interview which focused on Egyptian-European relations.

On Sunday, more than 57 percent of Swiss voters approved a right-wing motion to ban minarets on mosques, a decision that was met with an international backlash and charges of intolerance.

Abul Gheit expressed “regret that there is an increasing fear of Muslims in (European) societies as a result of the acts of some groups,” in allusion to attacks committed in the name of Islam.

Undoubtedly the guy believes he struck a very big note and achieved a huge political point for the Egyptian government.  Undoubtedly the voice of democracy and reform has been dealt a blow in this row and has been pushed a step back in its quest to counter the government plans. The president’s son is being groomed to replace him, amid more clampdown on the people of Egypt and more closing down of the political scene to make it almost impossible for any opponent to run. The government has reacted negatively to Ahmed AlBaradei’s initiative and has been trying with great effort to sabotage a possible candidacy by Amr Mousa and others.

So, again, thanks to the Swiss People’s Party, and thanks to any more xenophobic measures like this that may come in te next months/years!

Swine flu cases by Wilaya (region) in Algeria. Scaled logarithmically. The digits are the government set Wilaya numbers.

Indeed, reliable information is scarce: the ministry of health‘s figures are not broken down by region and are scarcely updated. Yesterday a bulletin has been posted that puts the national confirmed figure at about 362, with 8 confirmed deaths, putting the mortality rate at a very worrying 2%.  About 30 of the cases have been reported in the last 2 days, with the rate of infection expected to increase quickly in the next few days. 5 of the deaths have been reported in the last 5 days.

The statistics shown to the left have been assembled by wading through the recent news reports on national newspapers. The reports are often conflicting, hyperbolic or scarce in details.

Immediately, it is apparent that the three big cities, Algiers, Oran and Constantine have expectedly had some of the highest case counts. What’s worrying however, is the high infection count in the more inner Wilayas: Medea, MSila, Batna and the surrounding areas. These provinces have historically had low investment from the government and are severely lacking in infrastructure, including hospitals. Their readiness for the challenge of an epidemic is not reassuring. This is aggravated by the fact that a large percentage of people in these areas live in remote places and seldom decide to see a doctor. They span through the areas between the Atlas Mountains and the Saharan Atlas, a notoriously geologically difficult region that has been the hotbed of the Algerian revolution against French occupation, as well as a hiding place during the civil war of the 90s. The civil war has had its toll on the population and the infrastructure,  the provinces are recovering very slowly because of low investment and people moving north to the more populous and economically viable cities such as Oran, Algeria, Annaba and Constantine.

Swine flu deaths and cases in Algeria. Red indicated known confirmed cases. Black indicates confirmed deaths.

The map to the right shows the confirmed deaths: 8 deaths confirmed so far, in the capital Algiers(2), Ghelizane, Biskra, Ghardaia (2), Oum Bouaqi and Laghouat. Again, it is worrying that more deaths are happening in remote Wilayas: Ghelizane, Biskra, Laghouat and Ghardaia. The newspapers report 5 deaths of pregnant women (I could only verify 4).

The map also shows that the number of infections is almost certainly under-reported: there are Wilayas for which deaths have been reported but no infections confirmed yet. This may also reflect the tendency of the sick to treat the flu just like any seasonal flu and never go see a doctor. Although not officially allowed, most pharmacies in Algeria sell antibiotics over the counter, increasing the risk of antibiotic resistance and allowing the sick to avoid the doctor visit, even though antibiotics do not treat H1N1 and all other influenzas because they are viral.

The strategy of the Algerian authorities at first seemed to go hand in hand with the strategy facing the Global economic downturn: at first indicating that the population is safe from the illness, then slowly realising that the threat is real, and now in full gear against the illness. The ministry of health has put up more documents online on how to avoid the illness, both in Arabic and French, as well as more interviews and media appearances.

Speaking of media, in my recent post I commented on the tendency of the newspaper Echorouk to report sensationally. The chance has not been missed with the illness: the prospect of a conspiracy theory as to the origins of the illness are too great to miss by the newspaper (article is meta about Echorouk).  It is seriously commenting about the theory that the illness is human made by pharmaceuticals and western politicians, supposedly citing various journalists in Hungary, Austria and other places…

Sensational headline reads: we destroyed the Egyptians

Most Algerian Arab newspapers, like Echourouk, Elkhabar and Ennahar, turned the tables on this concept, and chose instead to embrace the lowest common denominator in search for ever increasing circulation numbers (except perhaps, the government owned newspapers, which have negligible circulation in comparison). This has, obviously, the unfortunate effect of being turned towards more populism and sensationalism a.k.a Algerian version of the right wing Daily Mail. In fact, these newspapers sometimes put the Daily Mail to shame with their incredibly racist stories and caricatures,  e.g. vs the local Chinese expatriates who work for Chinese construction companies. Most recently, the newspapers have just turned into sports dailies – today’s Echorouk news feed is dominated by sports headlines – all but just two.

The street price of a newspaper copy (officially 10DA, but generally can go up to 15DA in remote areas – a mere $0.1) is well below the cost of producing it. Most newspapers achieve profitably with advertising – so circulation numbers are very important. The advertising management market is dominated by the state owned Entreprise National de Publicite (ANEP), which collects advertising money from clients and distributes the adverts to the newspapers. This forces the newspapers to tread on careful lines or else the source of money is dried.

Perhaps, Elkhabar still tries to maintain a sense of intellectuality – opting instead to sometimes publish some well written reports on the state of the Algerian economy and political landscape. Its reluctance to populism is probably what made it lose its top spot as the best selling newspaper – just years ago it was dwarfing Echorouk, which was at the time, incredibly, seen as the newspaper for the intellectuals: the key element in Echorouk’s new image is the journalist turned into the Algerian version of Murdoch: Ali Faudel.

On the other hand,  Elkhabar are much more successful as an enterprise. In additions to attempts to create a private printing company, they have established a country wide distribution network – KD-Press, and they are looking to seriously challenge the dominance of ANEP with their new venture:  Elkhabar Pub, by creating a privately owned advertising management company. ANEP’s success was largely due to the fact that most of the clients were state owned companies, and that has changed recently. Most of the big spenders in advertising are private enterprises now. The private mobile networks Djezzy, Nedjma and Mobilis (this last soon to be privatised) compete fiercely by buying an incredible amount of newspaper ad space.

It’s also worthy to note that while they sell incredibly well, the authenticity of the popular newspaper is well known to be shoddy: a popular saying in Algeria is that reading a newspaper nullifies your Wudu (Ablution). There is also the decades old fear of the outside: the top newspapers are rumoured to use external expertise from the Untied States in the form of highly paid consultants. Speculation about the owners of the papers runs rampant – from business tycoons to army generals.

The lack of space on other media, such as radio and television, has certainly not hurt the newspapers either. However, pressure is mounting on the government to open up the audio visual space, with Echorouk positioning themselves well to create a new television station should the chance come by running an internet only channel on Youtube. Should this space be opened, there is no reason not to believe that it will be as vibrant as the newspaper space, given that other channels, such as the MBC and ART are eager to more affectively enter the Algerian market.